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Abstract
 
Many regions of the world would like to replicate the financial and monetary integration of the 
European Monetary Union (EMU).   Member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) have shown an interest in such an arrangement.  ASEAN is a political, cultural, and economic 
association that includes Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.  Many of these nations are experiencing rapid economic 
development while others are still relatively poor and under developed.  As such, they appear to be an 
unlikely group for currency unification. Older studies suggest that multiple currency union groupings 
may be possible in the short run that could be unified into a whole at an unspecified time in the future. 
The issue has been studied for some time and appeared defunct with the onset of the Asian Financial 
Crisis.  More than a decade has passed and another more global financial crisis has ensued leaving many 
Asian countries in better shape than their highly developed trading partners in the west. This leads to 
the need for further examination of the possible unification of some or all ASEAN members into a 
Regional Currency Arrangement. 
This dissertation evaluates the readiness of the ASEAN nations for monetary union using data 
from the post Asian Financial Crisis period.  Results of a formal G-PPP test show the area is an optimum 
currency area.  Analysis of other criteria shows incredible diversity across the countries in the region 
that would make unification a challenge.  Coordination of monetary policy would be most difficult given 
the variety of inflation rates and differences in depth of financial system development as explored in 
chapter 2.  Trade has increased in the region leading to better linkages among economies but the data 
shows that reaching full integration of all countries by the 2020 deadline without disruptions in some 
economies may still be difficult. 
 
Optimum Currency Areas, ASEAN, currency union, financial integration, G-PPP, trade, foreign direct 
investment, monetary integration, monetary policy coordination    
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G-PPP Tests and Qualitative Approaches 
 
Introduction 
 
ASEAN is the acronym for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.  It is a political, cultural 
and economic organization representing nations in Southeast Asia.  ASEAN members include Brunei 
Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and 
Vietnam.  As a grouping of somewhat similar yet dissimilar countries, ASEAN encourages social and 
cultural development and promotes the economic interests of associated nations.   The organization has 
become strategic in representing the region’s trade interests.  Its primary goals are regional stability and 
development.   
ASEAN was originally formed in 1967 from five nations as a successor to the Association of 
Southeast Asia which was originally set up to be an offset to the growth of Marxism in the region.  The 
nations of ASEAN have different systems of government and varying levels of social, political and 
economic development.  Government systems range from sultanates to military dictatorships to nascent 
democracies.  Two are single party socialist states. A few nations have been experiencing rapid 
economic advancement while others still struggle at the bottom tier of the lowest of lows for GDP per 
capita.  There is no one dominant shared industrial sector.  Brunei Darussalam is oil-rich.  Singapore is a 
services oriented economy.  Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia still have dominant 
agriculture sectors as well extensive traditional economies.   These less industrialized nations also seek 
development through providing labor and resources via horizontal trade channels and have turned into 
major recipients of outsourced manufacturing value. 
Still, the position of East Asia to challenge North America and Western Europe as the leading 
economic zone has never been stronger since the latter two regions are emerging weakened from the 
global financial crisis of 2008-2009. The world economy is becoming increasingly tri-polarized.  Many   
East Asian countries—most notably China—have embraced export-driven development policies. This has 
led to increasing trade flows both inside and outside the region.  ASEAN members are part of an 
increasingly influential economic zone that includes the economies of China, South Korean and Japan; 
the three Asian tigers of the ‘plus three’. This region is now generally referred to as ASEAN+3.  
Examination of direction of trade data elucidates increasing financial and economic openness between 
the ASEAN members, its plus three neighbors, and nations outside the geographic region. 
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Recent studies and literature have focused on the period directly following the Asian Financial 
Crisis of 1997. The events of the period brought into question the predominant currency regimes.  Many 
countries experienced severe hardship from unilaterally fixed exchange rates.  Movement to a floating 
exchange rate regime has helped in terms of the major global currencies (yen, dollar, Euro) but led to 
other issues in an environment where intra-regional trade is expanding. These developments have 
brought renewed interest for a shared currency to facilitate trade. Coordination of other goals 
associated with unification is more elusive.   
There exists increased political will for cooperation since the 1997 financial crisis.  The ASEAN+3 
efforts were launched in 1999 with the establishment of a larger ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). The 
ASEAN+3 members include ASEAN members plus the regions’ powerhouse economies of Japan, China, 
and South Korea.  The primary purpose of this agreement is to reduce tariff obligations and attract more 
foreign direct investment (FDI). The Chiang Mai Initiative was introduced in 2001 to promote exchange 
rate stability among members.  The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) was set up in 2003 with a 2015 
deadline for completion of key free trade and integration goals that move the region towards 
homogeneity of trade laws, capital flows, development goals, and per capita incomes.  Complete 
economic integration—including a common currency and shared central bank—of ASEAN is scheduled 
for 2020.  The three Asian tigers are expected to continue their independent currencies and status while 
participating in the Free Trade Area.  Other countries have and are expected to join the regional Free 
Trade Agreement.  Both New Zealand and Australia are participants.  
Plans are in place to move to financial and monetary integration and union for some countries in 
the region.  Rapid development and a global financial crisis that has destabilized the major currencies 
have changed the region.  Have these conditions created a better chance that the region represents an 
Optimum Currency Area (OCA)? Are the countries involved with the AEC initiative moving to a position 
where successful monetary union is possible? Which cluster of countries seems to have the best shot at 
merging?  Is dollarization more likely to occur with smaller countries and the three Asian Tigers or will 
the smaller countries continue to seek a single identity implied by the original ASEAN charter?  These are 
all important research questions that are researched research in the three chapters of this dissertation. 
Chapter 1 begins by establishing the background and motivation of the entire dissertation.  A 
general literature review of OCA criteria and empirical studies immediately follows the introduction.  
The empirical research of the chapter is divided into three parts. The first part explains and motivates 
the G-PPP model which is a formal test for the presence of an Optimal Currency Area.  This is followed 
by a brief review of recent literature followed by analysis and results from tests for nonstationarity and 
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cointegration.  Next, a review of qualitative factors identified as important to successful integration 
highlights trends in the macroeconomic variables—or forcing variables—that are important to the G-PPP 
analysis as well as serve as general OCA criteria. These variables include measurements of financial and 
economic openness. The last section of the chapter provides conclusions. 
 
Background and Motivation of the Study 
 
Early OCA theory provides essential insight into potential costs and benefits of financial 
integration of politically independent countries. Although it has been nearly 40 years since its inception, 
the earliest works still provide major insight into an idea that has gained prominence and support in an 
era of global trade.  Adoption of single currencies by countries within a region is generally thought to 
lead to greater economic integration, lower transaction costs, and higher levels of both trade and 
investment within the region.  Unification eliminates issues involved with exchange rate instability 
especially for regions with limited hedging and risk management opportunities.  A shared, single 
currency, central bank, and monetary policy are usually the penultimate goal of financial integration.  It 
has also been determined that this step eliminates harmful monetary policy spillovers and competitive 
devaluations. Unification is thought to pave the way for beneficial institutional changes and can 
eliminate the route to relaxed monetary policy for political purposes that usually create inflation. 
Mongelli (2002) provides a classification scheme of the primary benefits and costs of 
participating in an OCA.  He considers the first set of benefits to be improvements in ‘microeconomic 
efficiency’.  Many of the ones just mentioned can be attributed to the shared currency’s ability to better 
function as money.  There also exist benefits that reduce transaction costs and riskiness because of 
increased circulation of the single currency.  A shared currency provides large and diverse markets with 
heightened price transparency. This is thought to foster more competitive markets and increase the size 
and diversity of the economy.  Mongelli (2002) also finds that many studies fall into a grouping that find 
increased macroeconomic stability as well as economic growth with shared currency adoption.  Again, 
price stability and a large populace of users eventually leads to more sophisticated financial markets and 
increased ability to react and weather exogenous shocks.   This means that small countries can access 
financial innovations and markets more quickly than they could alone. 
Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010) focus on studies that elucidate the macroeconomic costs and 
benefits of monetary union with focus on the results from the EMU.  Fiscal coordination is an area ripe 
for political pitfalls. A recent issue of interest is fiscal free-riding as well as enforcement of monetary and 
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fiscal policy commitments.  The study speculated that the cost-benefit trade-off of unification of 
developed nations may differ substantially than those of less-developed countries and implied that 
further study was required. 
Formation of an OCA has costs as well as the aforementioned benefits.  Corden (1972) showed 
that perhaps the biggest cost of integration is that member countries forgo control of their national 
monetary policy. This creates fewer policy options and limits the set of feasible economic allocations.  
However, it adds credibility to countries that have had trouble with their financial or banking systems or 
with inflation in the past or those known to use currency manipulations for export growth.  This 
outcome is especially important for countries with governments that have misused inflation or taxation 
policies or have been known for weak monetary and financial markets.  However, this still represents 
removal of important stabilization tools frequently required during tough economic times.  It also 
removes any potential benefits to the government from inflation taxes. This includes ‘tax bracket creep’ 
and ‘inflating away the national debt’. 
The importance of integration of financial markets and institutions as well as the potential for 
problems aligning political interests of member countries cannot be understated.  Each country must 
rely more on fiscal policy for business cycle stabilization and coordinate with others through their 
representation to the central monetary authority for interest rate level changes. Countries must share 
many economic characteristics in order to not destabilize themselves or their neighbors upon 
experiencing an exogenous shock.  Countries with poor fiscal policy measures are apt to disturb the 
arrangement. The recent situation in the EU with Greece has amply demonstrated that one member 
with poor fiscal policy can impact the currency as well as the overall perceived riskiness of countries 
within the monetary union due to close and intense linkages. 
Of course, there are some transactions costs to be considered.  This would include 
administrative, legal and production costs of re-denomination of contracts, vending machines, and just 
simply getting the populace adjusted to the new currency. The actual costliness to countries of the loss 
of direct control is still being debated in the literature.   
Alesina et al (2002) find that as long as countries experience co-movements of both output and 
prices, there will be little cost. Calvo and Reinhart (2002) argue that costs will be minimal for a country 
that has improperly used monetary policy in the past. The benefits of a credible monetary policy and a 
respected currency bring more rewards to weaker countries than punishment.  Corsetti (2008) uses a 
stylized micro-founded model of costs involved with adopting common currency and finds these costs 
are of the “same magnitude as the costs of the business cycle”.   He further determines that common 
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monetary policies can be efficient even when “shocks are strongly asymmetric provided that the 
composition of aggregate spending tends to be symmetric at union-wide level”.   
Much of the work on the ASEAN monetary union has compared statistics prior to or directly 
after the Asian Financial Crisis. Since then, many of the ASEAN countries have successfully developed 
intensive export strategies and attempted to move closer to an ASEAN version of the Maastricht criteria.  
Additionally, the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 has provided further opportunities and challenges 
for countries in the region.  Since the 2015 deadline looms, it is pertinent to reexamine the issues 
surrounding readiness for proposed unification among the members of ASEAN for CU using both formal 
and informal criteria. 
 
General Literature Review and Research Questions 
 
Successful economic and financial market integration among European Union nations has led to 
interest in other regions for similar arrangements.  Monetary integration includes several phases that 
may ultimately progress to complete monetary unification.  Typically, countries with some kind of 
mutual economic, political, or cultural interest will meet to determine the feasibility of coordinating 
exchange rates, factor movement, and capital markets. These countries will assess their current 
situation and plan ways to move their economies and financial markets closer together over time.  The 
penultimate state of monetary union can include a common central bank and currency but there are 
many intermediate stages that can be achieved which usually result in enhanced trade and investment 
performance for the participating countries.  Easing the transition to union is essential so that acute 
exchange rate adjustments do not disrupt the economies of participating countries. 
A body of literature has established theoretical criteria that promote successful integration and 
union.  Harmony in readiness factors is considered essential to assessing the potential OCA.  Inherent 
problems of adjustment when instituting monetary unification were first discussed in Friedman (1953) 
who argued that such a transition was only possible with near complete nominal price and wage 
flexibility within and between countries.  If wage and price rigidity are present, resultant exchange rate 
adjustments can cause sustained unemployment in one country and/or acute inflation in the other.  
Kawai (1987) contributed to this line of work by showing that wage and price flexibility significantly aid 
the short run adjustment that follows an exogenous shock. 
The seminal work on the possibilities of monetary unions was written by Robert A. Mundell in 
1961 elucidating what are now known as Optimum Currency Areas (OCA).  This paper introduced what is 
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now known as the Mundell criteria for OCA as well as the definition of an OCA.  Mundell defines an OCA 
as “an area within which exchange rates are fixed”.  As an OCA, the area can share a single currency or 
have currencies pegged in unison to a shared target.  OCAs usually have a single monetary authority and 
a single, shared currency as the final goal as mentioned previously. 
 Mundell (1961) argued that regions or countries with a high degree of factor mobility are ideal 
candidates for an optimum currency area. This is because factor income and output prices have already 
experienced a high degree of integration due to the law of one price. Specifically, he believed countries 
should have a high degree of internal factor mobility, but a lower degree of external factor mobility.  
This lessens the impact of the reconciliation of nominal price differences between countries. Achieving a 
high degree of factor mobility in the relevant countries can be politically challenging.  Mundell argued 
that factor flexibility can decrease the chance that union will result in disruptive exchange rate 
adjustments. 
Ingram (1962) claimed that enhanced financial integration eases the transition to a single 
currency or pegged union and reduces potential disruptions from capital inflows to interest rates or 
other factor prices.  McKinnon (1963) suggested that the degree of economic openness was an 
additional factor.  His believed that countries that are open to trade or are already heavily trading can 
successfully form an OCA because of their high degree of product market interrelatedness.  McKinnon 
determined that a high degree of goods market integration and analogous production structures 
provides an economic environment with symmetric shocks.   Symmetry of shocks has become a meta-
property used to assess the extent of possibly damaging exchange rate adjustments.   
Kenen (1969) argued that countries with widely diverse exports and production but similar 
structure were the best candidates for OCA.  Similar structure provides the mega-property of 
symmetrical shocks so that wage and price adjustments to disturbances occur similarly across countries.  
Kenen argued that highly diversified products and services provide further insulation from major 
disturbances.  This characteristic is generally referred to as fiscal integration.    
Corsetti (2008) suggests that convergence in consumption and spending patterns may be a more 
important criterion for checking country suitability for OCA than the narrower Kenen (1969) criteria.  
Other works during the seventies suggested that there had to be a level of political will that would 
generate cooperation on country-level laws promoting institutional linkages, joint commitments to 
compliance, and shared macroeconomic goals.  Mintz (1970), Haberler (1970), and Tower and Willett 
(1976) focused on the various dimensions of political alignment required for successful monetary union. 
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Kenen’s thesis was later opposed by Krugman (1993) who suggested the opposite was true.  
Krugman determined that monetary union causes greater industrial specialization, less diversification, 
and therefore less protection from shocks.  Kenen also contended that countries that are more 
politically integrated will be more likely to risk share with member countries so that any members 
adversely impacted by monetary union will be helped by other members.  This would be akin to cross 
border fiscal policy between members. 
Fleming (1971) claimed that external imbalances frequently stem from persistent differences in 
national inflation rates.  He maintained that the terms of trade remain stable when inflation rates 
between countries are low and similar over time.  This relationship reduces the need for nominal 
exchange rate adjustment.   Monetary union is more easy and feasible under these conditions.   
McKinnon (2001) and Mundell (1973) assert that financial integration may also help with an 
economic monetary union.  This argument is based on members’ ability to adjust wealth portfolios, 
manage foreign exchange reserves, and hold assets across borders.  This argument considers financial 
integration as a form of risk management or insurance that can ease transition.  It also is a sign of the 
degree of capital mobility which feeds into the earlier Mundell criteria.  This brings variables like interest 
rates and cross-country direct investment flows into possibly signals of readiness. 
Empirical studies of OCA readiness find proxies or direct measures of the various criteria set out 
in the theoretical works.  The most traditional empirical measurements used to assess OCA readiness 
are based on the Mundell criteria which look for openness, factor mobility and symmetry of shocks. 
Structural VAR methodology that employs the AD-AS models of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) are the 
preferred method for evaluating symmetry of shocks.   There are also formal tests for General 
Purchasing Power Parity (G-PPP) that employ co-integration tests first posited in Enders and Hurn 
(1994).  The last method used for empirical studies is cluster analysis.  Most of the empirical studies of 
the last ten years assess the performance of the EU and closely examine the criteria or search for 
additional regions that may represent an OCA.  Most of this research validates and clarifies the 
theoretical characteristics proposed over 40 years ago. 
Many empirical studies are based on estimations of the Maastricht Criteria. These are the five 
criteria set out in the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) that must be met by European countries seeking to 
adopt the Euro. The criteria are also based on the early theoretical works as well as the early experience 
of the EU.  The Maastricht Criteria specify a rate of inflation, a level of budget deficit as a percentage of 
GDP, a level of national public debt as a percentage of GDP, a level of long term interest rates that 
compares favorably to other EU member countries, and the adoption of an Exchange Rate Mechanism 
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for the country’s national currency.  These criteria have been established so that the new member and 
current members are less likely to experience disruptive adjustments in prices that could destabilize the 
currency and the financial markets.  These criteria were considered the most germane to determining 
business cycle synchronization at the time of the treaty. They still serve as the benchmarks of the 
readiness factors. 
Much of the empirical literature for ASEAN and its potential for financial and monetary union 
stems from the immediate post-Asian financial crisis period dating from July, 1997 to roughly mid-1999.  
Conclusions generally determined that—at best—the ASEAN nations could find several tiers or 
groupings of countries that could possibly consolidate in the near term.   Since then, there have been 
some attempts at coordination between countries on laws and standards as well as increased intra-
region trade. An additional consideration is the global financial shock in 2008. These events suggest that 
it may be time to recheck the regional alignment.  It is possible that rapid development and joint use of 
exports has led to a greater synchronization of business cycles regionally. 
Bayoumi and Mauro (1999) examine the potential costs and benefits of a regional currency 
arrangement for ASEAN just after the Asian financial crisis. The authors found that members of ASEAN 
seemed less suited for integration than members in the EU prior to signing of the Maastricht treaty. At 
the time, the researchers found little political commitment to achieve the blending of financial and 
economic intuitions required for success.  They argued that differences in development levels would 
create political pressure for differing policy agendas. 
Yuen (2000) uses discriminant analysis to find various clusters of economies in the ASEAN region 
that might be suitable for integration into smaller subsets. She uses the technique to study a set of 
typical macroeconomic variables to determine the possibility of a progression to full integration by 
integrating small regions first. 
Moon, Yoon, and Rhea (2000) compare ASEAN to the EU and find that there exists no reason to 
believe that the EU is any superior position to a potential ASEAN Economic Community.   Wilson (2002) 
looks at the political efforts made up to date as well as the economic states of the ASEAN nations’ post-
Asian financial crisis.  Wilson (2002) found that the Asian financial crisis had increase the differences 
between the nations however it had increased the political will to unify.  The study focused on the lack 
of ‘well-developed supranational institutions” in the area that could coordinate responses to problems 
associated with financial and economic shocks.  The investigators were unable to find any sophisticated 
level of monetary cooperation in any key variables and found insufficient symmetry in nearly every 
combination of nation group in response to shocks.   
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Zhang et al (2004) use a three variable structural VAR model to study the symmetry of shocks 
across a series of East Asian economies.  The estimates are used to study the responses to the shocks as 
well as the speed of adjustments to shocks.  This study also suggested that the overall region appears ill-
suited for integration but there are some countries that might be an OCA so that subsets could 
potentially move into a currency union.  The overall region could then prepare to move closer to a more 
complete union at an unspecified date in the future. 
Park & Sohn (2005) use a “regionalization coefficient” and an “intra-regional trade propensity” 
index to study trade flows in the area.  They found increasing regional trade flows after the Asian 
Financial crisis and estimated that by 2003, the East Asian region had reached a level of trade 
comparable to that of the EU observable in the late 1970s.  The investigators found this to be 
extraordinary considering most of this had happened outside a formal trade organization and concluded 
that it was the result of the incredible amount of economic growth. If this is the case, then the dynamics 
suggest that data and analysis of the region has a short shelf life.   It also suggests an increasing level of 
economic interdependence in the region that could create better dynamics for monetary integration. 
Tang (2006) studies twelve Asian countries using the S-VAR technique to identify response and 
speed of adjustments to both demand and supply shocks. Again, using the mega-property of symmetry 
of shocks only, it appears that only sub-groupings within the region are prepared for unification into 
some currency arrangement. 
Azai et al (2007) uses the Maastricht Criteria to check for long-run real convergence in GDP per 
capita Growth among the ASEAN-5; a subset of ASEAN.  The study uses data from 1978-2004 for 
Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines.  Once GDP per capita at first differences 
was confirmed stationary, an Auto-Regression Distributed Lag model was used to check for the long run 
relationship between the countries using the five Maastricht variables. The authors found that this 
subgroup of ASEAN had basically met the criteria and may have the potential to form a currency union.  
Ibrahim (2008) uses cluster analysis and finds that the ASEAN+3 are too heterogeneous to be 
considered an OCA.  The study concludes that potential unification would be costly. The conclusion is 
based on analysis of the differing impact of the Asian Financial crisis on the economies of these 
countries.  The OCA criteria selected were volatility in real GDP, real exchange rates, and interest rates, 
openness to trade, and convergence of Inflation.   ASEAN 5 members were included in the study as well 
as the Republic of South Korea and People’s Republic of China. 
 Given the progress noted in empirical literature in interregional trade and political will, there 
should be improvement in measurements connected to successful monetary integration as these 
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nations move further away from the Asian Financial Crisis and implement initiatives to prepare for 
integration.  This leads to important research questions. Has the region made any significant progress in 
binding institutions and legal structures closer together?  Has increased interregional trade patterns led 
to a level of increased financial and economic openness to suggest an expansion of possible subsets that 
form an OCA? What impact has the latest global financial crisis had on key variables in the region?  What 
steps should ASEAN take if it does have the political will to move forward to monetary union along the 
lines of the EU?  Are some clusters of countries more ready for integration or would pursuing 
dollarization with an Asian tiger be a better strategy? This dissertation provides a basis to examine and 
answer these important questions. 
There have been many attempts to rank or prioritize suggested OCA properties.  Each of the 
various readiness factors has gone through periods of evaluation and imminence. Many have been 
tested and discussed several times over.  Ishiyama (1975) was the first to suggest that more than one 
criterion should be evaluated and that each criterion should be weighted based on the interests and 
welfare of each individual country.   Analysis of conflicting results in properties should be considered in 
context of the preferences, priorities, and weakness that investigators observe in each member.  One 
member’s weakness could possibly be diluted by another member’s strength, even though on the 
surface, the formal results may suggest an unlikely union.  This is why it is suggested that a variety of 
measurements—as opposed to a more limited analysis of singular criterion—be undertaken.  The 
Ishiyama (1975) approach is taken in this dissertation.  Studies in all chapters weigh both formal and 
informal readiness factors when considering complete unification and potential unification clusters. 
This chapter approaches unification readiness using Generalized Purchasing Power Parity Theory 
(G-PPP) and provides additional insight into some of the fundamental macroeconomic variables that 
force nonstationarity of real exchange rates in the proposed OCA.  These variables also stand as 
important qualitative measures of monetary and financial integration readiness because increased 
linkages between countries creates a better chance that the G-PPP will hold and therefore the countries 
represent an OCA.  Additionally, the qualitative variables show characteristics that are considered 
determinants of successful integration readiness. 
 
The Generalized Purchasing Power Parity Approach 
 
Enders and Hurn (1994) developed a theory of G-PPP using Engle Granger methodology (1987) 
of cointegration analysis.  Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is a theory of exchange rate determination that 
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links national price levels and exchange rates in a way that shows that the rate of currency appreciation 
or depreciation is equal to the difference between foreign and domestic inflation rates.  In reality, there 
can be many deviations from PPP.  There is a way to statistically test the viability of long run PPP, 
however.  This involves determining if the deviations from PPP are stationary or nonstationary.  If the 
deviations are nonstationary, then the PPP theory is rejected.  This is because they are not transitory 
and rooted in things like demand or supply shocks.  They are permanent.  Persistent deviations are 
acceptable but permanent ones are not.  Long run PPP holds if the sequence of deviations is stationary.1   
G-PPP posits that real exchange rates are generally nonstationary. This is because of the 
fundamental macroeconomic variables that determine these rates.  They are nonstationary and follow 
different growth paths.  The theory implies that OCA candidate countries should share common 
stochastic trends if they experience symmetric shocks in their fundamental macro variables. In other 
words, their economies should converge.  Finding this variable behavior for a set of countries means 
that set of countries is an OCA.  
The theory follows from the idea that the forcing variables—or the behavior of real 
macroeconomic shocks—will affect real exchange rates similarly even when domestic economies differ 
if sufficient linkages exist between countries.  The obvious linkage is trade but more subtle linkages like 
technology transfer and flows of labor and capital exist also.  Macroeconomic fundamentals should 
move together and be sufficiently interrelated so that the real exchange rates will display common 
stochastic trends. OCA theory suggests that the real exchange rates within a currency area should be co-
integrated.  This means that the bilateral real and/or multilateral exchange rates of countries in the 
currency area should have at least one co-integrating vector of real exchange rates. 
One formalized G-PPP test uses the methodology of Enders and Hurn (1994) to determine if 
there are co-integrated vectors in bilateral exchange rates of countries in the proposed OCA. The 
methodology used in this paper is Johansen-Juselius (1990) multivariate co-integration.  This test checks 
for equilibrium relationship between multilateral real exchange rates such that: 
 
RER12t  =α13t RER13t+ …+ α 1m RER1mt +εt          (1.1) 
 
RER is the real exchange rate between the country m and country 1 in period t and α1m are the 
parameters of the co-integrating vector representing linkages among economies in the proposed 
                                                          
1
 Enders, Walter, Applied Econometric Time Series, Second Edition, John Wiley and Sons, 2004, page 186 
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currency area. The stationary stochastic disturbance term is εt is considered white noise present at the 
appropriate time period.     
This study uses the multilateral Johansen-Juselius technique on RERs for ASEAN+3 countries 
during the period of 2000-2010.  This period is after the Asian currency crisis of 1997-1998 but includes 
the recent 2007-2008 global financial crises and the Thai Political Crisis of 2008-2010.  (See Table 13 in 
Appendix A for other dates and events relevant to ASEAN+3.) There are good reasons for choosing this 
period.  First, most of the studies in current literature concentrate on the Asian financial crisis period 
and the recovery period directly following the crisis so that this period is well-studied.    
Second, the ASEAN cluster of nations has signed a variety of agreements that attempt to move 
each country’s laws, regulations, and economies closer together since the crisis period so looking for 
signs of progress in coordination attempts is appealing from a policy assessment viewpoint.    
Liberalization of financial institutions has occurred along with a period of increased trade and 
investment flows (Kawai, 2009).   As an example, the 2000-2001 “Chiang Mai Initiative” was undertaken 
to boost monetary cooperation.  If these initiatives have been successful, a marked improvement in 
results should be noticeable when compared with prior literature.  
Third, many ASEAN economies used a de facto US Dollar peg prior to the pre-Asian financial 
crisis period.  This regime choice for so many nations undoubtedly produced correlations that confuse 
analysis for that period.  Removing this data should provide clearer results. 
There are several papers of interest that specifically study the post Asian Financial crisis using a 
G-PPP approach. Taguchi (2010) tests for possible OCAs using the entire Asian region instead of 
countries specific to the ASEAN block.  The motivation for using 17 Asian countries is the large number 
of free trade agreements that exist and will expand trade throughout in the region.  Taguchi argues that 
the ASEAN bloc is important but also notes that large numbers of free trade agreements also exist 
among other members.  There is the possibility of a more generalized South Asian Custom Union (SACU) 
prior to any complete integration by ASEAN.  Taguchi found that ASEAN and south Asia passed the G-
PPP condition.  Additionally, co-integrating relations between specific members implied a strategy of 
subgrouping certain countries prior to complete unification.   Japan, China, and South Korea were 
determined to not to be candidates for any ASIAN OCA.   The research supported the idea of “strategic 
implementation’ where smaller subgroups could possibly unify prior to the long run goal of complete 
ASEAN unification. 
Ahn, Kim and Chang (2006) found two subsets of countries that could comprise an OCA.  The 
first group subgroup included the ASEAN countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand.  The 
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second subgroup included Hong Kong SAR, Japan, Republic of South Korea and Taiwan.  This studied not 
only applied the G-PPP tests but also included an S-VAR model to test for symmetry in response to 
macroeconomic shocks which relates to the underpinning relationships of G-PPP theory.  The authors 
used data from Jan 1970-Sept. 2003 so their data includes periods when many Asian nations were using 
pegs to the USD as well as the data from the Asian Financial Crisis.  
Choudry (2005) uses data from 1990-2002 to compare changes in co-integrating relationships in 
ASEAN 5 exchange rates before and after the Asian currency crisis.    The countries of interest include 
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Korea. These countries are frequently 
considered a potential cluster for standalone unification.  Currencies were checked vis-à-vis the Thai 
Baht (THB), United States Dollar (USD) and the Japanese Yen (JPY).  Choudry found substantial 
differences in these relationships between the post and pre Asian financial crisis period. 
Ogawa and Kuawaski (2003) apply the G-PPP test to the currencies of the ASEAN 5 vis-à-vis a 
common currency basket. Their analysis includes the People’s Republic of China.  The authors found that 
the ASEAN 5 countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand could from an 
OCA using a common currency basket if People’s Republic of China was added to the group.  
 
Methodology and Hypotheses 
Equation (1.1)—stated in the previous section—provides the stylized format of the G-PPP 
model.  For empirical study, the equation for the real exchange rate (r) for country i at time t is 
calculated as: 
 
         (    )     (    )                    (1.2) 
 
 Si,t is the nominal exchange rate for country i in period t 
 Pi,t is the price level for country i in period as measured by each country’s CPI, and 
 Pbase,i,t  is the base currency price level in period t  
 
This means the nominal exchange rate is stated as the number of home currency units it takes 
to buy one unit of the currency of the base country.  The G-PPP model assumes a group of m+1 
countries represent an OCA in a world with n number of countries. This provides a reduced form 
solution with a vector limited to m number of real exchange rates.  RERs are expected to be stationary in 
PPP theory but this is unlikely in the real world because of macroeconomic shocks and overshooting 
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(Dornbusch, 1976). Co-integration provides an alternative way to check this theory given the issues with 
real world, persistent deviations. G-PPP theory states that PPP will hold if all macroeconomic forcing 
factors are non-stationary. The vector of macroeconomic forcing factors subject to shock is assumed 
nonstationary. RERs will have common stochastic trends if these macroeconomic fundamentals are 
related to some degree through various linkages like trade, technology transfers or capital and labor 
flows.  OCA theory states that they will be interrelated if the countries form an OCA. This means there 
will be at least one linear combination of bilateral or multilateral real exchange rates that will be 
stationary if the countries form an OCA.  If analysis shows at least one linear combination, the RERs are 
co-integrated.    
Several other concepts are important since the co-integration tests reveal underlying 
relationships between economies.  First, the coefficients of RERs are functions of the parameters.  These 
parameters represent fundamentals achieved in an AS-AD style equilibrium economy. Second, switching 
base currencies in the model causes the parameters in the co-integrating vector to renormalize.  Third, 
the model provides RERs for the countries of interest that can be expressed as weighted averages of the 
other RERs in the currency area. These weights are dependent on the underlying trade linkages between 
countries within the OCA and reflect that relationship.  The weights also reflect the broader linkages 
between the economies. 
Data was obtained from the Asian Development bank and the International Financial Statistics 
database of the International Monetary Fund.  All ten ASEAN (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Vietnam) members plus the three Asian Tigers 
(China, South Korea, and Japan) were included in the analysis.  The real exchange rates for these 
countries were calculated using equation (2).   Monthly data came from the period 2000-2101.  Most 
researchers consider the post-crisis period start as April 1999 so the series clearly represents the post-
crisis period. 
G-PPP methodology can test for bilateral or multilateral co-integration relationship between the 
countries in question vis-à-vis a base currency of choice.  Co-integration tests for this study follow the 
method developed by Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990).   The presence of 
cointegrating vectors in nonstationary time series is determined using the maximum likelihood 
procedure.  Two or more nonstationary time series are considered cointegrated if at least one linear 
combination of the series is stationary. The technique identifies the number of cointegrating vectors 
that are then analyzed using the Trace and the Maximum Eigenvalue Tests.  The null hypothesis for the 
15 
 
trace test is that r or fewer cointegrating vectors exist.  Large values demonstrate evidence against the 
null hypothesis.  
A specific stochastic structure is required to appropriately use the cointegration technique.  The 
time series must be examined to see if the variables are stationary or nonstationary in levels. Formal 
tests must show the presence of a unit root in the real exchange rates. Cointegration is a test 
appropriate for checking equilibrium between nonstationary time series.  These tests must confirm that 
the RERs are nonstationary in levels but stationary after first difference.  
Table 1.1 shows the results of unit root tests for all ASEAN+3 RERs using USD as the base 
currency.    P-values of the Weighted Symmetric (WS) and Dickey-Fuller (DF) tests are shown at the 5% 
and 10% level of significance.  The WS test has higher statistical power when compared to the Dickey- 
Fuller test (Pantula et al, 1994).    Both tests confirm a unit root. Cointegration techniques are 
appropriate under the null of a unit root.  The more traditional tests assume stationary variables and are 
inappropriate under the hypothesis that real rates are nonstationary. 
 
Table 1.1: Unit root tests for real exchange rates 
This table shows p-values from the Weighted Symmetric (WS) test for unit root.  The WS test has higher statistical 
power than the Dickey and Fuller test (see Pantula, Gonzalez-Farias, and Fuller, 1994). Optimal lag length was 
chosen using the Akaike Information Criterion and is shown in parenthesis.  Real exchange rate for country i is 
calculated:         (    )     (    )             where Si,t is the nominal exchange rate for country i in period t, 
Pi,t is the price level for country i in period, and PUS,t is the United States price level in period t. Log of real exchange 
rates are normalized to zero (0) in January 2000. 
 
 Weighted Symmetric  Dickey-Fuller 
 Statistic P-value Lags  Statistic P-value Lags 
ASEAN         
Brunei Dollar -2.69 0.19 5  -3.47 0.04 5 
Cambodia Riel -1.74 0.80 3  -2.23 0.47 3 
Indonesia Rupiah -2.58 0.25 3  -3.31 0.07 3 
Lao Kip 0.32 1.00 6  -1.69 0.75 7 
Malaysia Ringgit -3.01 0.08 7  -2.90 0.16 7 
Myanmar Kyat -1.68 0.83 3  -2.41 0.38 5 
Philippines Peso -1.35 0.93 5  -2.99 0.13 2 
Singapore Dollar -2.44 0.33 5  -3.07 0.11 5 
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(Table 1.1 continued) 
 Weighted Symmetric  Dickey-Fuller 
 Statistic P-value Lags  Statistic P-value Lags 
Thailand Baht -1.94 0.69 3  -4.12 0.01 3 
Vietnam Dong 0.17 1.00 3  -0.65 0.98 3 
Plus 3        
China (Renminbi Yuan/USD) -2.32 0.42 3  -2.31 0.43 3 
Korea (Won/USD) -2.48 0.31 5  -2.34 0.41 5 
Japan (Yens/USD) -2.04 0.62 2  -2.61 0.28 2 
 
The maximum likelihood estimation procedure is used to determine the presence and number 
of co-integrating vectors.   Optimal lag length was chosen using the Akaike Information Criterion.   The 
logs of RERs are normalized to zero (0) in January 2000.   A stationary long-run relationship between 
variables is identified when a nonzero vector is indicated these tests. The constant term is important 
because it helps indicate the trend.   There is evidence that RERs may be subject to seasonal trend.  
Dummies representing months were used to control for seasonality.  The first test uses the RERs of all 
ASEAN+3 nations vis-à-vis the United States Dollar (USD).  A second test uses the RERs of a subset of 
ASEAN nations plus the three Tigers using the USD as the base currency.  Final tests use the subset of 
ASEAN nations with and without the three Tigers vis-à-vis the Republic of South Korean Won (KRW).    
 
Results and Conclusions for G-PPP tests 
Figure 1.1 shows a graph of the estimated RERs from ASEAN+3 countries during the period using 
USD as the base currency. Both the price level and RERs are normalized to 100 percent in January 2000. 
Brunei Darussalam, Myanmar and Singapore have been marked for reference.  Clearly, Brunei and 
Singapore move together.  These currencies become almost 50 percent cheaper (in real terms) over 
time in respect to January 2000.  Myanmar trends the opposite direction—it appreciates substantially—
and goes off on its own.  There is something unique going on with Myanmar that makes it an unlikely 
candidate for financial and monetary integration.   
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Figure 1.1:  Real exchange rates for ASEAN + 3 (2000 - 2010) 
 
This graph shows the real exchange for ASEAN+3 countries versus the U.S. dollar. Real exchange rate for country i 
is calculated as         (    )     (    )            . Where Si,t is the nominal exchange rate for country i in 
period t, Pi,t is the price level for country i in period, and PUS,t is the United States price level in period t. Both price 
level and real exchange rates are normalized to 100 percent in January 2000. Only Brunei, Myanmar and Singapore 
have markers in order to highlight them. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 removes Brunei Darussalam, Myanmar and Singapore from the previous graph.  
China, Korea, Japan and Malaysia are highlighted.  Korean is centrally located in the series whereas the 
Chinese Yuan Renminbi (CNY), the Malaysian Ringgit (MYR) and the Japanese Yen (JPY) are located in the 
bottom tier of the series.  One distinct pattern can be seen during the global financial crisis. There is a 
decline in nearly all series in the 2007-2008 time period followed by an increase in the 2008-2009 time 
period.  
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Figure 1.2: Real exchange rate for Select ASEAN + 3 (2000-2010) 
 
This graph shows the real exchange for ASEAN+3 countries versus the U.S. dollar. Real exchange rate for country i 
is calculated as         (    )     (    )            . Where Si,t is the nominal exchange rate for country i in 
period t, Pi,t is the price level for country i in period, and PUS,t is the United States price level in period t. Both price 
level and real exchange rates are normalized to 100 percent in January 2000. Brunei, Myanmar and Singapore are 
not considered in this graph. China, Korea, Japan and Malaysia are marked in order to highlight them. 
 
 
 
Tables 1.2 through 1.7 show the results of the Johansen-Julius cointegration tests.  These tests 
look for multilateral co-integration in ASEAN, ASEAN+3, and an ASEAN subgroup with and without the 
three Asian Tigers.  One set of test statistics applies to the January 2000 to October 2010 period.   A 
second period of January 2006 to April 2010 is also evaluated separately to see if increased linkages are 
occurring post-Asian financial crisis given policy changes.  The latter, isolated period also contains data 
from directly surrounding and during the Global Financial Crisis and hence the data reflects this macro 
shock. 
Asterisks (** and * denote 1% and 5% significance levels, respectively) indicate significance.  
Table 1.2 shows the results of the test for the ASEAN+3 countries vis-à-vis USD. Trace and eigenvalue 
tests show four and three significant vectors—respectively—at the 5% or above significance level using 
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USD as the base currency for the period January 2000 to October 2010.  The trace test indicates five 
significant vectors while the eigenvalue test indicates one for the latter period of January 2006 to April 
2010.  The trace test is a conventional likelihood ratio test. All eigenvalues are less than one.  More than 
one stationary long-run relationship exists between variables when tests indicate more than one 
nonzero vector.  Johansen and Juselius (1990) emphasize that more than one nonzero vector indicates a 
strong and robust relationship.   These results indicate evidence of an OCA.  Results indicate shocks to 
the economies will transmit from one set of RERS to others and imply an OCA. 
 
Table 1.2: Johansen-Juselius cointegration tests for ASEAN + 3 countries 
(Real exchange rates vis-à-vis USD) 
 
Optimal lag length was chosen using the Akaike Information Criterion.  Real exchange rate for country i is 
calculated as         (    )     (    )             where Si,t is the nominal exchange rate for country i in period 
t, Pi,t is the price level for country i in period, and PUS,t is the United States price level in period t. Log of real 
exchange rates are normalized to zero (0) in January 2000. ** and * denote 1% and 5% significant level, 
respectively. 
  
 Period: 2000:01 - 2010:10  Period: 2006:01 - 2010:04 
Hypothesis Eigenvalue Trace 
Statistic 
Max-
Eigenvalue 
Statistic 
 Eigenvalue Trace 
Statistic 
Max-
Eigenvalue 
Statistic 
H0: r = 0 0.64 558.6       118.4  0.88 522.2     109.5 
H0: r<=1 0.55     440.3**     92.3**  0.80    412.7** 82.9* 
H0: r<=2 0.48     347.9**   76.9*  0.70   329.8** 62.7 
H0: r<=3 0.43      271.0**   65.4*  0.65   267.1** 54.6 
H0: r<=4 0.35   205.6* 50.3  0.61   212.6** 49.3 
H0: r<=5 0.30 155.3 41.9  0.58      163.3* 44.9 
H0: r<=6 0.27 113.4 36.2  0.47      118.4 33.1 
H0: r<=7 0.20 77.2 26.2  0.42        85.3 28.2 
H0: r<=8 0.15 51.0 19.0  0.31 57.1 19.0 
H0: r<=9 0.11 32.0 13.8  0.30 38.0 18.3 
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Table 1.2 (continued) 
 Period: 2000:01 - 2010:10  Period: 2006:01 - 2010:04 
Hypothesis Eigenvalue Trace 
Statistic 
Max-
Eigenvalue 
Statistic 
 Eigenvalue Trace 
Statistic 
Max-
Eigenvalue 
Statistic 
 H0: r<=11 0.05 7.2 5.8  0.09 5.1 5.0 
 H0: r<=12 0.01 1.4 1.4  0.00 0.1 0.1 
 Optimal Lags = 6  N = 117     AIC= -6,033.6  Optimal Lags = 0  N = 52     AIC= -2,049.1 
 
 
Performing additional tests on a subset of ASEAN+3 seemed prudent since Figure 1 showed 
three distinct patterns.  Myanmar showed a unique and strong increasing pattern of RERs. The Kip 
appreciated at a very high rate—almost exponential rate—during the time period indicating some 
unique circumstance.  Brunei Darussalam and Singapore shared a decreasing pattern of RERs that 
moved away from the rest of the series.  These currencies depreciated almost 50 percent (in real terms) 
over time in respect to January 2000.  
These three countries were removed from the subset for the second test to elucidate the 
underlying patterns in those countries whose RERs were closer together.  Table 1.3 shows results from 
the Johansen and Juselius (1990) cointegration tests for the subset of ASEAN+3 vis-à-vis USD and 
normalized equations.  This analysis was done without Brunei Darussalam, Myanmar and Singapore in 
the data set. 
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Table 1.3: Johansen-Juselius cointegration tests for subset of ASEAN + 3  
(real exchange rates vis-à-vis USD) 
 
This table shows Johansen-Juselius cointegration tests for ASEAN + 3 countries removing Brunei Darussalam, 
Myanmar and Singapore. Optimal lag length was chosen using the Akaike Information Criterion.  Real exchange 
rate for country i is calculated as         (    )     (    )             where Si,t is the nominal exchange rate for 
country i in period t, Pi,t is the price level for country i in period, and PUS,t is the United States price level in period t. 
Log of real exchange rates are normalized to zero (0) in January 2000. ** and * denote 1% and 5% significant level, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A. Cointegration tests for ASEAN +3 without Brunei, Myanmar or Singapore 
 Period: 2000:01 - 2010:10  Period: 2006:01 - 2010:04 
Hypothesis Eigenvalue Trace 
Statistic 
Max-
Eigenvalue 
Statistic 
 Eigenvalue Trace 
Statistic 
Max-
Eigenvalue 
Statistic 
H0: r=0 0.60    321.5**  104.4**  0.81 380.1** 87.2** 
H0: r<=1 0.44     217.1**   66.3**  0.78  292.9** 77.7** 
H0: r<=2 0.38 150.8 54.7*  0.67  215.2** 57.6* 
H0: r<=3 0.20 96.1 26.2  0.57  157.6** 44.2 
H0: r<=4 0.18 69.9 23.1  0.53  113.4** 38.9 
H0: r<=5 0.12 46.8 15.1  0.45  74.5* 31.5 
H0: r<=6 0.11 31.7 13.7  0.31  43.0 19.3 
H0: r<=7 0.09 18.0 11.4  0.23  23.8 13.8 
H0: r<=8 0.05 6.6 6.3  0.17  10.0 9.5 
H0: r<=9 0.00 0.3 0.3  0.01    0.5 0.5 
 Optimal Lags=8  N=115     AIC= -4,494.5  Optimal Lags=1  N=52     AIC= -1,537.1 
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Table 1.3 (continued) 
Panel B. Normalized equation to ៛/$ (KHR/USD) 
 Period: 2000:01 - 2010:10  Period: 2006:01 - 2010:04 
Cambodia Riel 1.000   1.000 
Indonesia Rupiah     1.062**          -0.436** 
Lao Kip  0.669*    -0.556* 
Malaysia Ringgit  -4.644**      -1.162** 
Philippines Peso                    -1.562      -0.394** 
Thailand Baht                    -0.102  -0.228 
Vietnam Dong                    -0.997      -0.441** 
China Yuan Renminbi   5.395**       3.352** 
Korea Won                    -0.031       0.646** 
Japan Yen                    -1.227*                         -0.019 
 
Panel B shows the normalized equations based on the first significant vector. Normalizing on the 
real exchange rate provides an intuitive economic interpretation for the estimated cointegrating 
vector(s). Normalized vectors reveal the relationship between the RERs in the data set.  The vector is 
considered to show long run elasticities. The vectors are normalized using the Cambodian Riel (KHR) vis-
à-vis USD.  The KHR was chosen simply because Cambodia came first in the alphabetic list of countries in 
this subset of ASEAN.  
 The multivariate cointegration test revealed at least two vectors at the 5% or above significance 
level for the subset for the entire period of January 2000 to October 2010.  The trace test showed six 
significant vectors while the Eigenvalue Statistic showed three significant vectors for the period January 
2006 - April 2010 with at least 5% significance. All eigenvalues were less than one.   
Normalized equations show significant coefficients that are less than one for the Indonesian 
Rupiah (IDR), the Laotian Kip (LAK), the Malaysian Ringgit (MYR), the Philippine Peso (PHP), and the 
Vietnamese Dong (VND) for the period January 2006 to April 2010. The Thai Baht’s (THB) coefficient was 
less than one but did not test significant.  The SKW tested significant with a less than one coefficient. 
The Chinese Yuan Renminbi (CNY) tested significant but with a positive coefficient that was greater than 
one.  The Japanese yen (JPY) also had a less than one coefficient but did not test significant.   This first 
test—based on the USD—showed 5 RERs with significance of at least 5% level for the overall period.  
The latter period showed seven RERs with significance over the 5% level for the overall period. The IDR, 
the LAK, the MYR and the CNY maintained their previous levels of significance having tested at the 1%, 
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the 5%, the 1% and the 1% levels of significance respectively.  In this latter period, the Philippines Peso 
(PHP), the VND, and the KRW became significant at the 1% level.  The JPY continued to be insignificant 
as did the THB. The KRW and the CNY impose opposite effects from the other significant currencies. 
The implications of the long run elasticities are interpreted thusly using the results of the latter 
period.  A 1% fall (rise) in the Malaysian-United States real exchange rate will induce a 1.162% rise (fall) 
in the real exchange rate of Cambodia-United States. Something in either a trade or investment linkage 
between Malaysia and Cambodia causes the two countries to have an inverse relationship in their real 
exchange rates. The relationship between the KHR and KRW are direct and close to one to one.  
One of the interesting things to see when comparing the overall period to the latter period is 
that many of the signs in the normalized equations switched indicating some basic change in the 
underlying forcing variables between the countries.  The IDR switched from a positive relationship over 
the entire period to an inverse one in the latter period while still maintaining its 1% significance level.  
Again, this indicates some fundamental change in either trade or investment relations between the 
Cambodia and Indonesia that transmits through the exchange rate.  The LAK changes signs from positive 
to negative also.  The MYR kept its negative sign as did the THB, the VND and the JPY.  The CNY 
remained positive for both test periods.  The KRW went from an inverse relationship to a positive one.  
These results suggested further testing using this subset of ASEAN without the three Tigers.  The 
results are shown in Table 1.4 with normalized equations shown in panel C.1.  Normalized equations still 
use KHR/USD.  The Trace and Max-Eigenvalue Statistic identify only one cointegrated vector at the1% 
significance level for this configuration for the entire period.  The Trace Statistic identifies two additional 
cointegrated vectors for the last period at the 5% significance level while the Max-Eigenvalue Statistic 
still identifies one at the 1% level.  All Eigenvalues are less than one. Normalized equations use a 
KHR/USD basis. Only one significant currency was identified for the entire period.  It was the MYR at the 
1% level. The latter period indicated five significant relationships all at the 1% level.  These currencies 
were the IDR, the LAK, the MYR, the PHP, and the THB. The VND was the sole currency not testing 
significant. 
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Table 1.4:  Johansen-Juselius cointegration tests for a subset of ASEAN 
(Real Exchange Rates vis-à-vis USD) 
 
This table shows Johansen-Juselius cointegration tests for a sub set of ASEAN countries. Brunei, Myanmar and 
Singapore are excluded from the analysis. Optimal lags length was chosen using the Akaike Information Criterion.  
Real exchange rate for country i is calculated as         (    )     (    )             where Si,t is the nominal 
exchange rate for country i in period t, Pi,t is the price level for country i in period, and PUS,t is the United States 
price level in period t. Log of real exchange rates are normalized to zero (0) in January 2000. ** and * denote 1% 
and 5% significant level, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Cointegration tests for a sub set of ASEAN (see panel B for countries included in the sample) 
 Period: 2000:01 - 2010:10  Period: 2006:01 - 2010:04 
Hypothesis Eigenvalue Trace 
Statistic 
Max-
Eigenvalue 
Statistic 
 Eigenvalue Trace 
Statistic 
Max-
Eigenvalue 
Statistic 
H0: r=0 0.41 144.6** 58.6**  0.65 156.4** 54.4** 
H0: r<=1 0.29 86.0 37.6  0.46 102.0* 31.9 
H0: r<=2 0.15 48.4 18.0  0.42 70.1* 28.1 
H0: r<=3 0.14 30.3 16.7  0.32 42.0 20.0 
H0: r<=4 0.07 13.7 8.4  0.21 22.0 12.5 
H0: r<=5 0.04 5.3 4.3  0.15 9.4 8.6 
H0: r<=6 0.01 1.0 1.0  0.02 0.9 0.9 
 Optimal Lags=12  N=115     AIC=-3,317.8  Optimal Lags=3  N=52     AIC= -1376.6 
 
Panel B.1. Normalized equation to ៛/$ (KHR/USD) 
 Period: 2000:01 - 2010:10  Period: 2006:01 - 2010:04 
Cambodia Riel  1.000  1.000 
Indonesia Rupiah  0.462     -0.949** 
Lao Kip -0.333     -1.640** 
Malaysia Ringgit      5.528**      2.082** 
Philippines Peso -0.167     -1.599** 
Thailand Baht -1.151      1.120** 
Vietnam Dong -0.693  -0.076 
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Additional tests for ASEAN +3 were accomplished using the KRW as base the currency.  The 
entire group—including Brunei Darussalam, Myanmar, and Singapore—were included in the 
Cointegration test shown in Table 1.5. Normalized equations used the Brunei Darussalam dollar (BND) 
vis-à-vis KRW. The results are reported in Table 1.5, Panel B. As with the other tests, there is an increase 
in the number of cointegrating vectors in the second period observations.  The Trace Test shows nine 
cointegrating vectors in the later period with eight of them testing at the 1% significance level and the 
remaining one at the 5% significant level. The Trace Test for the entire period identified 4 significant 
vectors at the 1% significance level.  The Eigenvalue Statistic also identified four vectors. Two vectors 
were identified at the 1% significance level and two at the 5% level. Panel B shows the normalized 
equations based on the Brunei Darussalam Dollar (BND) to KRW. All countries tested significant at the 
1% level during the period January 2006 to April 2010.   The IND and LAK tested significant at the 1% 
level during the entire period of January 2000 to October 2010. The JPY, MYR, the Singapore Dollar 
(SGD) and the KHR tested significant at the 1% level for the entire period.  China had a nearly a one-to-
one, direct relationship with BND. 
Table 1.5, Panel B also indicates those currencies that switched and maintained their direct or 
inverse relationships when normalized equations were set BND/KRW.  The KHR maintained its positive 
relationship with the BND as did the CNY. The PHP, SNG and JPY maintained their inverse relationship. 
The other currencies switched signs. The IND went from positive to negative as did the LAK. The MYR 
the THB, the VND, and the Myanmar Kip (MAK) went from negative to positive. Again, something 
fundamental underlying the trade or investment relations in the countries switching signs changed.  It is 
impossible to identify the cause from this analysis. The size of the coefficients changes slightly.  In 
absolute value, their sizes are similar and less than one. A comparison of the sizes of the absolute value 
of the coefficients between periods provides some insight into volatility for the period. There is 
movement but not exceedingly large change. 
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Table 1.5: Johansen-Juselius cointegration tests for ASEAN +3 (real exchange rates vis-à-vis KRW)            
This table shows Johansen-Juselius cointegration tests. Optimal lag length was chosen using the Akaike 
Information Criterion.  Real exchange rate for country i is calculated as         (    )     (    )                
where Si,t is the nominal exchange rate for country i in period t, Pi,t is the price level for country i in period, and 
PKOREA,t is the Korean price level in period t. Log of real exchange rates are normalized to zero (0) in January 2000. 
** and * denote 1% and 5% significant level, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Cointegration tests for ASEAN + 3 
 Period: 2000:01 - 2010:10  Period: 2006:01 - 2010:04 
Hypothesis Eigenvalue Trace 
Statistic 
Max-
Eigenvalue 
Statistic 
 Eigenvalue Trace 
Statistic 
Max-
Eigenvalue 
Statistic 
H0: r = 0 0.61 472.2** 108.7**  0.87 547.3** 104.6** 
H0: r<=1 0.49 363.4** 78.5**  0.82 442.7** 89.2** 
H0: r<=2 0.44 284.9** 67.4*  0.77 353.5** 75.9** 
H0: r<=3 0.40 217.5** 59.2*  0.71 277.7** 63.6* 
H0: r<=4 0.28 158.4 38.6  0.60 214.1** 48.3 
H0: r<=5 0.26 119.8 34.5  0.58 165.8** 45.6 
H0: r<=6 0.21 85.3 27.7  0.48 120.1** 34.1 
H0: r<=7 0.18 57.6 23.2  0.47 86.1** 32.9 
H0: r<=8 0.11 34.4 13.2  0.37 53.2* 24.1 
H0: r<=9 0.10 21.2 12.0  0.27 29.0 16.5 
H0: r<=10 0.07 9.2 8.4  0.16 12.5 8.9 
H0: r<=11 0.01 0.8 0.8  0.07 3.6 3.6 
 Optimal Lags = 6  N = 117     AIC= -4,891.0  Optimal Lags = 1  N = 52     AIC= -2,244.2 
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Table 1.5 (continued) 
Panel B. Normalized equation to BD$/ ₩ 
 Period: 2000:01 - 2010:10  Period: 2006:01 - 2010:04 
Brunei  1.000  1.000 
Cambodia      0.439**  0.263** 
Indonesia    0.102*  -0.284** 
Lao    0.201*  -0.511** 
Malaysia    -0.703**  0.142** 
Myanmar                        -0.080  0.209** 
Philippines  -0.207*  -0.247** 
Singapore   -0.632**  -0.801** 
Thailand                       -0.284  0.401** 
Vietnam                       -0.175  0.107** 
China                        0.305  0.899** 
Japan  -0.235**  -0.142** 
 
Table 1.6 shows the Johansen-Juselius cointegration test without Brunei Darussalam, Myanmar 
and Singapore.  The Trace Statistic identified 2 significant vectors. One was identified at the 5% and the 
other at 1% level while the Max Eigenvalue Statistic identified one at the 1% level for the entire period.  
The Trace Statistic identified the same 2 vectors at the 1% level of significance for the latter period and 
an additional sector at the 5% significance level. The Max Eigenvalue identified three significant vectors 
for the latter period.  One was identified at the 1% level and the remaining two at the 5% level. 
Normalized equations were set KHR to RKW. The overall period had 4 RERS identified as significant The 
MYR and the JPY were identified as significant at the 1% level while the INDR and VND were identified as 
significant at the 5% level. The cointegration test for the latter period identified five currencies as 
significant at the 1% level. These were the INDR, the LAK, the PHP, the THB, and the CNY. 
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Table 1.6: Johansen-Juselius cointegration tests for subset of ASEAN+ 3  
(Real exchange rates vis-à-vis KRW) 
 
This table shows Johansen-Juselius cointegration test dropping Brunei, Myanmar and Singapore from the sample. 
Optimal lags length was chosen using the Akaike Information Criterion.  Real exchange rate for country i is 
calculated as         (    )     (    )                where Si,t is the nominal exchange rate for country i in 
period t, Pi,t is the price level for country i in period, and PKOREA,t is the Korean price level in period t. Log of real 
exchange rates are normalized to zero (0) in January 2000. ** and * denote 1% and 5% significant level, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A. ASEAN +3- (Brunei, Myanmar and Singapore) 
 Period: 2000:01 - 2010:10  Period: 2006:01 - 2010:04 
Hypothesis Eigenvalue Trace 
Statistic 
Max-
Eigenvalue 
Statistic 
 Eigenvalue Trace 
Statistic 
Max-
Eigenvalue 
Statistic 
H0: r=0 0.52 252.3** 84.7**  0.72 251.4** 65.8** 
H0: r<=1 0.37 167.6* 51.8  0.66 185.6** 56.5* 
H0: r<=2 0.27 115.8 36.6  0.59 129.1* 46.4* 
H0: r<=3 0.21 79.2 26.8  0.42 82.7 28.7 
H0: r<=4 0.18 52.4 22.0  0.35 54.0 22.2 
H0: r<=5 0.12 30.4 14.4  0.28 31.8 16.8 
H0: r<=6 0.09 16.0 11.2  0.20 15.0 11.7 
H0: r<=7 0.04 4.8 4.2  0.06 3.4 3.3 
H0: r<=8 0.01 0.6 0.6  0.00 0.1 0.1 
 Optimal Lags=12  N=111     AIC= -3,335.2  Optimal Lags=3  N=52     AIC= -1,283.4 
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(Table 1.6 Continued) 
Panel B. Normalized equation to ៛/ ₩ (KHR/RKW) 
 Period: 2000:01 - 2010:10  Period: 2006:01 - 2010:04 
Cambodia  Riel 1.000  1.000 
Indonesia Rupiah 0.780*     -0.705** 
Lao Kip 0.422     -3.313** 
Malaysia Ringgit   -5.342**  0.657 
Philippines Peso -1.178     -1.525** 
Thailand Baht 0.480      1.058** 
Vietnam  Dong -1.870*  0.186 
China Renminbi Yuan 3.242     4.512** 
Japan Yen  -1.620**                      -0.216 
 
Table 1.7 presents the final multivariate cointegration tests for just the subset of ASEAN with 
the RERs vis-à-vis the KRW.  At least one vector was identified for the entire period at the 1% level of 
significance.  Three significant vectors were identified for the latter period for both the Trace and Max-
Eigenvalue tests for at the 5% or above level of significance. 
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Table 1.7: Johansen-Juselius cointegration tests for subset of ASEAN 
 (Real exchange rates vis-à-vis KRW) 
This table shows Johansen-Julius cointegration tests, but dropping from the sample Brunei, Myanmar and 
Singapore. Optimal lags length was chosen using the Akaike Information Criterion.  Real exchange rate for country i 
is calculated as         (    )     (    )                where Si,t is the nominal exchange rate for country i in 
period t, Pi,t is the price level for country i in period, and PKOREA,t is the Korean price level in period t. Log of real 
exchange rates are normalized to zero (0) in January 2000. ** and * denote 1% and 5% significant level, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A. Cointegration test for a sub set of ASEAN (see panel B for countries included in the sample) 
 Period: 2000:01 - 2010:10  Period: 2006:01 - 2010:04 
Hypothesis Eigenvalue Trace 
Statistic 
Max-
Eigenvalue 
Statistic 
 Eigenvalue Trace 
Statistic 
Max-
Eigenvalue 
Statistic 
H0: r=0 0.39 167.5** 59.2**  0.68 169.8** 59.1** 
H0: r<=1 0.31 108.3** 44.2*  0.46 110.6** 32.4 
H0: r<=2 0.19 64.1 25.3  0.45 78.2** 31.3 
H0: r<=3 0.14 38.8 17.4  0.34 46.9 21.6 
H0: r<=4 0.13 21.4 16.6  0.26 25.3 15.9 
H0: r<=5 0.04 4.8 4.4  0.15 9.3 8.7 
H0: r<=6 0.00 0.4 0.4  0.01 0.6 0.6 
 Optimal Lags=3  N=120     AIC=-2,209.0  Optimal Lags=3  N=52     AIC= -1,283.4 
 
Panel B. Normalized equation to (៛/$ (KHR/USD) 
 Period: 2000:01 - 2010:10  Period: 2006:01 - 2010:04 
Cambodia Riel 1.000  1.000 
Indonesia Rupiah 0.462    -0.949** 
Lao Kip -0.333   -1.640** 
Malaysia Ringgit 5.528**     2.082** 
Philippines Peso -0.167    -1.599** 
Thailand Baht -1.151     1.120** 
Vietnam Dong -0.693  -0.076 
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The normalized equations set KHR/RKW identified the MYR and the JPY at the 1% level for the 
overall period. The IDR and VND were identified as significant for the overall period at the 5% level. 
There was a change in the identified significant currencies in the latter period.  The LAK, the PHP, the 
THB and the CNY became significant at the 1% level in addition to the IDR.  The JPY and the VND lost 
their significance.  There were multiple sign changes too indicating changes in the basic relationships 
underlying many of the currencies.   
The strengthening of the cointegration test results over time is confirmed with tests vis-à-vis 
USD and the KRW. This indicates that the relationships in exchange rates in the group are likely 
becoming stronger as intraregional trade increases, as coordination and implementation of integration 
strategies proceed, and as the countries move farther away from both the Asian currency crisis period 
and dollar pegs. The long run elasticities of the normalized equations signal other changes in the basic 
trade and investment relationships between the countries that are transmitted through exchange rates.   
Our results reinforce the findings of Choudhry (2005) who concluded that the post Asian 
currency crisis showed signs of being an OCA while the pre-Asian currency crisis period did not. Our 
results compliment this study since our evidence indicates there are stronger linkages moving farther in 
time away from the currency crisis period.    The Choudhry study generally found one cointegrating 
vector for most tests.  A few of the tests showed two cointegrating vectors.  Our results should many 
more cointegrating vectors.  This was especially true for latest time period. 
Calculation of speed of adjustment to disequilibrium is assessed as suggested by Engle and 
Granger (1987) following the results of cointegration tests that reject the null hypothesis that the 
number of multilateral cointegrating vectors is zero. These coefficients are presented in Table 1.8 for the 
subset of ASEAN+3 and the subset of ASEAN vis-à-vis the USD (Panel A) and for ASEAN+3 and the two 
subsets vis-à-vis the KRW (Panel B).  Panel A does not include all of ASEAN+3 vis-à-vis USD because there 
is no evidence of cointegrating vectors in the sample.   
Enders and Hurn (1994) argue that countries with similar demand parameters will have small 
parameters in the co-integrating vector. This is because the size of the coefficients in the vector depends 
on the forcing variables and the models that show a high degree of cointegration will have many 
channels to transmit the information to speed the adjustment to the long-run relationship. The 
coefficients shown in Table 1.8 represent the speed of adjustment to the long run cointegration 
relationship in the ASEAN+3 for the period of interest. They indicate how quickly a change in an RER 
away from the G-PPP equilibrium will take to correct. The expected sign of theses parameters should be 
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opposite of those in the co-integrating vector of RER.  The table shows the results of the overall period 
and of the latter period.   
 
Table 1.8:  Speed of Adjustment 
 
This table shows speed of adjustment (alphas) from the Johansen-Julius cointegration tests.  Panel A presents the 
coefficients using the USD as reference.  Panel B presents the coefficients using the KRW as reference.  Panel A 
does not include ASEAN + 3 because there is no evidence of cointegrating vectors in the sample. 
 
Panel A. Speed of adjustment coefficients vis-à-vis USD 
 Subset of ASEAN + 3   Subset of ASEAN 
 2000 - 2010 2006-2010  2000 - 2010 2006-2010 
Brunei Dollar      
Cambodia Riel      0.023** 0.028     -0.027** 0.002 
Indonesia Rupiah -0.020 -0.003      -0.002     0.513** 
Lao Kip     -0.028** -0.074      0.017**    -0.045 
Malaysia Ringgit -0.007   0.204*      -0.003     0.145** 
Myanmar Kyat      
Philippines Peso -0.010 0.132       -0.003     0.245** 
Singapore Dollar      
Thailand Baht 0.002    0.235**        0.002 0.011 
Vietnam Dong     0.019**     0.130       -0.019**    -0.019 
China (Yuan/$)    -0.008**   -0.103**    
Korea (Won/$)      -0.001 0.242    
Japan (Yens/$) 0.003 0.033    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
Table 1.8 (continued) 
Panel B. Speed of adjustment coefficients vis-à-vis KRW 
 ASEAN + 3  Subset of ASEAN + 3  Subset of ASEAN 
 2000-10 2006-10  2000-10 2006-10  2000-10 2006-10 
Brunei Dollar -0.055   0.696       
Cambodia Riel  0.118**  -0.866*   0.028**  0.157**   0.026* -0.069 
Indonesia Rupiah  0.052   2.721**   0.002  0.379**   0.014  0.676** 
Lao Kip -0.192**   0.031  -0.017*  0.034  -0.038** -0.089* 
Malaysia Ringgit -0.029   0.196   0.003  0.171**   0.018  0.172** 
Myanmar Kyat -0.140*  -0.395       
Philippines Peso  0.023   1.420**   0.007  0.301**  -0.015  0.280** 
Singapore Dollar -0.001   0.905       
Thailand Baht  0.088  -0.199   0.014*  0.096  -0.013  0.044 
Vietnam Dong  0.153**  -0.525   0.021**  0.084   0.037** -0.018 
China (Yuan/$) -0.030*   0.292*  -0.003 -0.014    
Korea (Won/$)  0.128   0.017   0.011 -0.009    
Japan (Yens/$) -0.055   0.696   0.014*  0.096    
 
Size of the coefficients is important since high coefficients represent quick return to the long run 
cointegrating relationship, test significant, and are not considered weakly exogenous.  The results for 
the subset of ASEAN+3 vis-à-vis the USD for the overall period show consistently minute coefficients.  
Most did not register as significant.  Extremely small and insignificant coefficients mean that some of the 
RERs are weakly exogenous (Harris, 1995). Weak exogeneity means the equations for these variables 
have no information on the long-run relationship.   This is because the cointegration relationship does 
not enter into the equation.  Therefore, the variable can be omitted from the left hand side of the VAR. 
The largest coefficients for the Panel A data for the subset of ASEAN+3 for the later period were 
for the MYR/USD at 0.204 which showed significant at the 5 % level, the THB/USD which showed 
significant at the 1% level with a value of 0.2345 and the KRW/USD which had a coefficient of 0.242 that 
tested significant at the 1% level. These results imply that these three currencies adjust at the speed of 
about 20 to 24% per month. 
Panel B which shows the speed of adjustment coefficients vis-à-vis the KRW for the three 
groupings and two time periods provided more interesting results.  These results also suggest that the 
RERs of these countries have a much stronger relationship with the KRW than with the USD. All the 
34 
 
variables in all three groupings were less than 1 with the exception of the PHP/KRW. Its coefficient was 
significant at the 1% level with a value of 1.420 when PHP/KRW when grouped with the entire ASEAN+3 
and calculated only for the later time period.   
Coefficients for the KHR/KRW, the LAK/KRW and the VND/KRW tested significant at the 1% level 
in the ASEAN+3 set for the entire period.  The MAK/KRW and the CNY/KRW were significant at the 5% 
level.  The significant coefficients ranged—in absolute value—from 0.30 for the CNY/KRW coefficient 
and 0.192 for the LAK/KRW.  The latter period sample for the subset of ASEAN+3 which used the KRW as 
base currency showed four significant coefficients at the 1% level. The KHR/KRW showed a 15.7% 
monthly adjustment.  The IND/KRW showed a 37.9 monthly adjustment.  The MYR/KRW showed a 
17.1% speed of monthly adjustment.  The PHP/KRW coefficient suggested a 30.1% monthly speed of 
adjustment.   
This represents the rate at which the currency will appreciate when domestic inflation rates or 
the foreign nominal interest change.   Many coefficients did not test significant. This means that there 
are mostly likely undeveloped interest rate channels among other things in many of these countries.  
This could be due to the differences in development, institutions, and market which are known to exist 
in many of these developing nations. 
In general terms, the ASEAN+3 VAR identified one additional significant relationship when using 
the KRW as the base currency.   This is consistent with the general findings of the full G-PPP model 
which identifies the KRW as the most suitable base currency.   Changing the base currency changed the 
results.  The coefficients of some countries often became significant or lost their significance from one 
time period to the next.  The majority of coefficients show weak exogeneity in all of the subset models.  
The multivariate cointegration tests indicate that the area is most likely an OCA and has 
increasing numbers of linkages between the region’s economies over time.  There is evidence that 
shocks will transmit among countries.  There is a long-run stationary relationship between the RERs 
during the period. High speed of adjustment coefficients implies quick adjustment.  The model did not 
indicate a large number of large coefficients which means that many of the countries may not be 
developed enough to have sophisticated linkages. 
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Qualitative Factors 
 
Economic and Financial Openness and Factor Mobility 
A small open country is more likely to be ready to enter a currency union if its economy is 
heavily reliant on international trade.  This is because its economy is more likely to be impacted by 
exchange rate fluctuations and exogenous shocks.  McKinnon (1963) argued that in small open 
economies, the exchange rate cannot be useful to correct balance of payment issues because it is 
strongly linked to the prevailing price level.  Any change in the international price of goods being traded 
will transmit quickly to the domestic cost of living.   McKinnon concludes that a devaluation of currency 
would not achieve the desired result because of the rapid transmission of the change through the price 
of trade goods to domestic prices. Prices become less rigid or sticky as the economy becomes more 
open which makes it more likely that the Friedman thesis holds. 
Economic openness is multidimensional.   The ratio of trade to GDP is considered one such 
measure.  The traditional formulation is (X+M)/GDP where X is total exports, M is total imports, and GDP 
is Gross Domestic Product. The result is frequently referred to as trade openness. It is also standard to 
use either exports (X) or imports (M) over GDP (X/GDP or M/GDP). These represent the marginal 
propensity to import and the marginal propensity to export.  Foreign direct investment as a percentage 
of GDP, and the degree of trade integration measured as the ratio of reciprocal exports plus imports 
over GDP.  Another measurement is the percentage of tradeables vs. nontradeables in terms of 
production and/or consumption. 
Financial openness is also of interest. The newly developed Chinn-Ito index called KAOPEN 
measures a country’s degree of capital account openness. The index was introduced in Chinn and Ito 
(2006) and is based on “the binary dummy variables that codify the tabulation of restrictions on cross-
border financial transactions reported” to the IMF. 
A quick glance at recent annual data shows that the majority of the ASEAN economies are 
relatively open with the exception of Lao PDR and Myanmar. Lao PDR is a single party socialist republic.  
Myanmar is governed by a military junta. What trade occurs with these two countries tends to be 
regional and associated with bordering nations. Cambodia, Vietnam and Thailand show an increasing 
rate of openness while Indonesia and the Philippines have kept a more consistent level of trade. 
Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam and Singapore are definitely export driven economies.   There is a good 
deal of intraregional trade that occurs within the region because of the diverse nature of exports.   
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 Table 1.9 shows the marginal propensity to export (mpx) from 1995-2009. The mpx is a 
traditional measure of economic openness.  Three countries depend on exports.  Singapore had an mpx 
of 199.3 for 2009 and has had levels as high as 235.1 in 2006.  The small city-state nation is clearly 
export-dependent.  Malaysia’s MPX for 2009 is 96.4.  This number is down from a high of 117.5 in 2005.  
Brunei Darussalam’s 2008 MPX is 78.3 and shows a clear upward trend over the period of 1995-2009. 
Myanmar’s exports represent less than 1% of the country’s GDP and show a downward trend.  Lao PDR’s 
export numbers are not available in the same format as the other countries but looking its export 
numbers is US dollars and compared to its GDP which is stated in terms of Kips indicates a very low 
percentage also.   Thailand (68.4 in 2009) and Vietnam (68.3 in 2009) are also relatively dependent on 
exports. Indonesia (24.1 in 2009 with a falling trend) and the Philippines (31.7 in 2009 with a falling 
trend) are less dependent on exports. 
 
Table 1.9:  Economic Openness (Exports/GDP) 
           Export of Goods and Services as a Percent of GDP at current market prices (Marginal propensity to Export) 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Brunei  50.5 55.8 67.4 69.5 67.1 69.3 68.8 70.2 71.7 67.9 78.3 
Cambodia 37.2 49.9 52.7 55.4 56.5 63.6 64.1 68.6 65.3 52.7 n/a 
Indonesia 35.5 41.0 39.0 32.7 30.5 32.2 34.1 31.0 29.4 29.8 24.1 
Lao PDR n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Malaysia 121.3 119.8 110.4 108.3 106.9 115.4 117.5 116.5 110.5 103.6 96.4 
Myanmar 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 n/a n/a 
Philippines 51.5 55.4 49.2 50.2 49.6 50.9 47.6 47.3 42.5 36.9 31.7 
Singapore 183.9 195.6 191.6 192.3 212.5 224.4 230.0 235.1 219.1 228.9 199.3 
Thailand 58.3 66.8 65.9 64.2 65.7 70.7 73.6 73.6 73.4 76.5 68.4 
Vietnam 50.0 55.0 54.6 56.8 59.3 65.7 69.4 73.6 76.9 77.9 68.3 
Source: Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific, 2009 & 2010, Asian Development Bank 
 
 There are more sophisticated measures of openness than measuring the percentage of GDP 
represented by exports. Some empirical studies use global measures. Others focus on more regional 
measures of trade and financial market interaction.   Finding better proxies for both economic and 
financial openness is an active line of research.  Using several distinct proxies showing depth of 
trade within the region as compared to more globally can provide more robust results.  This is 
especially true when considering monetary union. 
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Mundell (1961) discussed how the need to change real factor prices and the nominal exchange 
rate between countries is lessened with high factor market integration. This is a long held tenet of basic 
trade theory.  This basically encourages factors to reallocate across markets so that higher efficiency is 
achieved as well as better allocation.  Unless there is a high degree of control of capital outflows and 
inflows by law, developing economies may experience a high degree of capital mobility.  Physical capital 
is not generally mobile.  The mobility of the labor factor depends on many factors.  This includes 
geography, language, cultural and religion, laws, and political considerations.  Labor mobility is usually 
low in the short run. 
Some regions—like the proposed currency arrangement in the Gulf—are more likely to achieve 
labor mobility because of the homogeneity of the populace and because their forms of government are 
more agreeable to such arrangements.  The extent of joint ventures, agreements between countries and 
the occurrence of liberal regulations and institutions usually serve proxy for degree of factor mobility. 
FDI patterns are quantitatively analyzed in the third essay.   
Financial Openness is usually associated with the extent and intensity of capital account 
controls. There are four groupings of binary variables considered to represent the presence or absence 
of financial openness. Unfortunately, these measures do not reflect intensity of openness and there are 
other ongoing attempts to quantify the strength of the controls.  Such effort is reflected in Chinn and Ito 
(2007) where an index captures the extent of openness in cross-border financial transactions. 
The binary variables include absence or presence of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on 
current account transactions, restrictions on capital account transactions, and a final group that looks at 
any requirements on surrender of export proceeds. The problem with any laws seeking to either 
liberalize or restrict financial transactions is their actual effectiveness.  Capital restrictions with 
increasing trade flows usually lead to black markets.  Additionally, many regimes are de jure but not de 
facto. 
Besides using the traditional binary variables, an interesting test of robustness uses various 
indexes like the KAOPEN index introduced in Chinn and Ito (2006). The index measures the presence of 
controls and the effectiveness of the controls in place. It is based a formulation of variables k1-k4 that 
indicate the presence or absence of the generally accepted groupings of controls that limit financial 
openness. 
 
(k1):  presence of multiple exchange rates  
(k2):  use of restrictions on current account transactions 
38 
 
(k3):  use of restrictions on capital account transactions 
(k4):  requirement of the surrender of export proceeds 
 
From the variable (k3), Chinn and Ito construct a new variable SHARE that uses a five-year 
window to provide a weighting representing that it takes time for controls to become effective.  This 
seems a more reasonable approach than using strict binary variables. 
 
         (
                                
 
) 
(1.3) 
The index of countries is maintained and updated by Chinn and Ito and is available for use by 
researchers. This variable as a test of robustness will evaluate the usefulness of the index as well as add 
a proxy that is new to analysis of readiness factors in proposed monetary unions.  This index is used in 
the third essay analyzing FDI and DOT patterns.   Table 1.10 shows the 2009 values for the Chinn-Ito 
Index for the ASEAN+3 nations. 
 
Table 1.10: Financial Openness (Chinn Ito Index) 
 2009 
Brunei Darussalam n/a 
Cambodia 1.232162 
Indonesia 1.147968 
Lao PDR -1.148165 
Malaysia -0.0974876 
Myanmar -1.84374 
Philippines  0.0972913 
Singapore 2.477618 
Thailand -1.148165 
Vietnam -0.0974876 
Japan 2.477618 
Hong Kong, China 2.477618 
South Korea -0.0974876 
Source: website of Drs. Chinn and Ito 
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Degree of Commodity Diversification:  consumption and production patterns 
Differences in consumption and production patterns correspond to the ability of countries 
within the OCA to respond to macroeconomic shocks.  Kenen (1969) argued that diversification in either 
consumed goods or produced goods keeps a country more insulated from shock.  Under these 
circumstances, it will be less necessary to use exchange rate manipulation to ameliorate the impact of 
the shock.  Countries that are diversified that join OCAs that are diversified will be in better positions to 
ride out shocks and less like to pass contagion from shocks to specific sectors to other countries. 
  Patterns of exports and imports as well as patterns of consumption and production can show 
the interrelatedness of the ASEAN+3 countries and their degree of difference or similarity.  These 
statistics are useful because they break out the direction of trade by sector and industry.  This data can 
help when studying the mega property of symmetry of business cycles.  Timing of entry into recessions 
or degree of impact by sector of recessionary forces can create problems within the OCA if countries 
experience different timing of cycles or different degrees of response to exogenous shocks.  This makes 
monetary and fiscal policy coordination difficult and could require cross-country fiscal policy support if 
one or more countries experiences a more extreme shock and monetary policy prescriptions would 
negatively impact other countries.  Chapter 3 in this dissertation focuses on both FDI and DOT patterns 
in the region. 
Table 1.11 provides a quick look at GDP broken down by three sectors: agriculture, industry and 
service.   This table provides some insight into why specific clusters may have been identified through 
the G-PPP approach.  Both Singapore and Brunei Darussalam have nearly nonexistent agriculture 
sectors. Both countries receive less than 1% of their GDP from agriculture. The next lowest country is 
Malaysia at 9.3% followed Thailand at 11.6%. Myanmar has the largest agriculture sector at 38.2% of 
GDP produced.  Both Cambodia and Lao PDR have agriculture sectors that represent about 1/3 of GDP 
produced. Brunei Darussalam has the highest source of its GDP from Industry at 74.1%. This sultanate is 
a producer of oil.   The next highest is Indonesia with 47.6%.  It is intuitive that countries that deal in 
similar goods in similar regions have closer parity of prices since they trade in the same markets. The 
ASEAN nations have a good deal of diversity in the production of goods and services.  This is an 
interesting juxtaposition to the proposed currency union for the GCC countries that are almost all 
exclusively oil-producing.  Diversity can help countries in that various sectors respond to macroeconomic 
shocks in various ways.  However, this could prove challenging to unified fiscal and monetary policy 
coordination since it is likely that countries may have different policy requirements as a result of 
different shocks.  Shocks coming from agriculture or oil sectors will definitely have varying impact on the 
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economies of the region.  However, the region meets the Kenen criterion in that ASEAN nations have 
diversified production patterns. 
 
 
Table 1.11:   Structure of Output (2009) 
(% of GDP at current market prices) 
 
 Agriculture Industry Services 
Brunei Darussalam 0.6 74.1 25.4 
Cambodia 32.5 22.4 45.1 
Indonesia 15.3 47.6 37.1 
Lao PDR 32.8 25.2 42.0 
Malaysia 9.3 43.4 47.3 
Myanmar 38.2 24.4 37.4 
Philippines 14.8 30.2 55.0 
Singapore 0.0 26.3 73.7 
Thailand 11.6 43.3 45.1 
Vietnam 20.9 40.2 38.8 
Source: Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific, 2009 & 2010, ADB 
 
 
Similarity in inflation rates across countries  
Table 1.12 shows that percentage change in the implicit GDP deflator for the period 2005-2009 
for countries in the ASEAN region.  The Fleming criteria suggest that low and stable inflation improve 
chances of successful union.  A quick glance at annual data for the last 14 years suggests the region has a 
long way to go to meeting the criteria.  Singapore is a world financial center. Its rates provide evidence 
of fairly disciplined monetary policy while Myanmar’s rate is consistent with poor governance. Lao PDR 
has shown marked improvement.    There are distinct differences in national inflation rates. 
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Table 1.12:   Implicit GDP Deflator 
(annual change in percent) 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Brunei Darussalam 1.1 0.2 1.0 2.1 1.1 
Cambodia 6.1 4.6 6.5 19.1 n/a 
Indonesia 14.3 14.1 11.3 18.2 8.4 
Lao PDR 7.8 14.4 4.3 6.0 -4.3 
Malaysia 4.6 3.9 4.9 10.3 -6.7 
Myanmar 19.2 21.3 23.7 13.6 4.6 
Philippines  6.5  5.2  2.9 7.5  2.6 
Singapore 2.1   1.6  6.5 0.9  -1.8 
Thailand 4.5 5.3 3.6 3.8 2.0 
Vietnam 8.2 7.3 8.2 22.1 6.0 
Source: Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific, 2009 & 2010, ADB 
  
Institutional, policy and regulation consistency, and political factors  
Table 1.13 in Appendix A shows a chronicle of dates and actions taken by the ASEAN and other 
nations to bring the region closer together. The Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) of 2000-2001 was a 
significant step towards bringing financial and economic institutions and regulations in the region closer 
for the purposes of expanding a more functional free trade zone.  The CMI included a multilateral 
currency swap arrangement among ASEAN+3 drawing on a foreign exchange reserves pool to help 
stabilize exchange rates in the region post-Asian Currency Crisis that was initiated in 2010.  This action 
was treated cynically at the time. Side-by-side comparison of results from later time frames in the G-PPP 
model to the overall  period  indicate that the further ASEAN moves away from the instigation of the 
CMI, the more noticeable the interconnectedness in the tests for cointegration.  While, the second essay 
will demonstrate that there are many institutional and development factors that make this integration 
complex, recent Free Trade Agreement activity and strategic plans for legal, institutional, and regulatory 
change have been negotiated and agreed upon.  What remains is continued will over the next decade to 
implement these changes. 
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Conclusions 
 
There is evidence that the ASEAN nations form the basis of an OCA and that steps are moving 
the economies of these nations closer together.  Complete financial integration is planned by 2020.  An 
economic community is planned for 2015. Both formal and informal criteria show overall progress albeit 
uneven progress from country to country.    
A Formal G-PPP test was used to verify unit roots before proceeding to multilateral co-
integration analysis.  These tests verified that all variables contain a unit root and confirmed that all 
RERs are nonstationary.  The first round of multivariate cointegration tests applied the RER of currencies 
for all ASEAN+3 nations vis-à-vis the United States Dollar (USD). This means that the USD was used as 
the foreign currency.  A second test applied the RER of currencies of select other ASEAN nations plus the 
three Asian Tigers vis-à-vis the USD.   This test was performed due to results from the first test.  
Estimates of Myanmar’s real interest rates showed a distinct and strong upward trending pattern that 
was unlike any of the other ASEAN+3 countries.  Estimates for Brunei Darussalam and Singapore showed 
that these two countries’ RERs clearly move together and appear to form a subset distinct from the 
others.  They have a strongly downward trending pattern and show similar patterned reaction to the 
Global Financial Crisis.  A third set of tests was performed using the subset of ASEAN nations using the 
KRW as the base currency since it showed the clearest relationship between the other currencies. 
Changing the base currency of the RERs changed the long-term relationships among several countries.   
These findings are distinct from other studies. 
  Based on these findings, a fifth set of tests was applied to ASEAN+3 vis-à-vis the KRW. This 
achieved the strongest results. Follow-up tests were performed on the subset of ASEAN+3 and the 
subset of ASEAN; each vis-à-vis the KRW. Each set of tests was also performed on the entire data period 
as well as the back half of the data period to determine if the relationships were strengthening over 
time.  The relationships were shown stronger at the end of the decade when compared to the entire 
period.  Tests showed a larger number of cointegrated vectors and more significant relationships in the 
later period.  Given the prior history of USD pegs, the pattern of similarity to the KRW, and a large 
number of integrated vectors for the later period than the entire period, the results indicate a growing 
impact from likely stemming from cooperative changes in policies.  This could be a result of changes in 
the de facto currency regimes in the post Asian currency crisis period.  Results could also undoubtedly 
reflect growing linkages coming from increased trade resulting from the increased number of Free Trade 
Agreements entered into by ASEAN+3 from 2008 to 2010.  Isolating later years from the total period 
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clearly shows increased linkages. This adds credence to the findings of Choudry (2005) who compared 
post and pre-Asian financial crisis data using the same methodology.    
Speed of adjustment analysis was possible since more than one co-integrating vector was found 
(Engle and Granger, 1987).  Speed of adjustment parameters measure how quickly a deviations in real 
exchange rates from G-PPP tend to correct and are reported vis-à-vis the USD and vis-à-vis the KRW.  
The parameters were generally small—with a few exceptions that were not consistent from subgrouping 
to subgrouping—indicating quick speeds of adjustment.  This also demonstrates close linkages between 
economies since deviations in exchanges are shown to adjust to equilibrium quickly.  This indicates that 
exchange rates in the area are not sticky.  Overall, G-PPP holds for ASEAN+3 which implying the 
existence of an OCA. 
While the formalized G-PPP approach showed that the area likely represents an OCA, the 
informal tests suggested that there is still variability in some of the underlying, forcing macro variables.  
There are distinct differences in inflation rates and financial and economic openness.   There are 
definitely differences in development.  Later essays in this dissertation will explore these issues. A 
review of ASEAN history shows the organization is systematically addressing major issues and has the 
structures in place to encourage but not coerce change.  ASEAN is long standing organization so many of 
these countries have had long term, strong relationships.  However, this does not mean that the political 
will or shared economic goals exist to make some of the most difficult institutional changes 
domestically.  Some of these countries have severe governance and political issues as witnessed in the 
recently experienced in the Thai Political crisis of 2008-2010.  The most noticeable may have come from 
the Trade Arrangements that do not necessarily require integration.  The institutional changes required 
from each country may be harder to achieve. 
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Potential Monetary Policy Coordination Issues 
 
Introduction and Literature Review 
 
Economic and financial market integration among European Union nations has led to interest in 
other regions for similar arrangements.  Monetary integration includes several phases that may 
ultimately progress to complete monetary unification.  Typically, countries with some kind of mutual 
economic, political, or cultural interest will meet to determine the feasibility of coordinating exchange 
rates, factor movement, and capital markets. These countries will assess their current situation and plan 
ways to move their economies and financial markets closer together over time.  The penultimate state 
of monetary union can include a common central bank and currency but there are many intermediate 
stages that can be achieved which usually result in enhanced trade and investment performance for the 
participating countries.  Easing the transition to union is essential so that acute exchange rate 
adjustments do not disrupt the economies of participating countries. 
One of the biggest issues surrounding the act of monetary integration is that member countries 
forgo control of their national monetary policy.   This raises the issue of importance of integration of 
financial markets and institutions as well as the potential for alignment of political interests of member 
countries.  Each country must rely on fiscal policy for business cycle stabilization and coordinate with the 
others through their representation to the central monetary authority.  The actual costliness to the 
country of loss of direct control is still being determined in the literature.  Alesina et al (2002) find that 
as long as countries experience co-movements of both output and prices, there will be little cost. Calvo 
and Reinhart (2002) argue that costs will be minimal for a country that has improperly used monetary 
policy in the past.  A helpful overview of the research in costs and benefits is provided in Beetsma and 
Giuliodori (2010). 
Chapter 2 examines issues surrounding Monetary Policy readiness for the proposed unification 
of ASEAN.  ASEAN is the acronym for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.  It is a political, cultural 
and economic organization representing nations in Southeast Asia.  ASEAN members include Brunei 
Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
and Vietnam.  As a grouping of somewhat similar yet dissimilar countries, ASEAN encourages social and 
cultural development as well as promotes the economic interests of associated nations.   The 
organization has become very important in representing the region’s trade interests.  Its primary goals 
are regional stability and development.   
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ASEAN members are part of an increasingly influential economic zone that includes the 
economies of China, South Korean and Japan. These nations are called the Asian tigers and are grouped 
under the heading ‘plus three’. This region is now generally referred to as ASEAN+3.  Additionally, there 
is a subgroup of interest called the ASEAN 5 that includes the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore 
and Thailand. These five are considered as having the most developed economies and political systems 
in ASEAN. Examination of direction of trade data shows increasing financial and economic openness 
between the ASEAN members, its plus three neighbors, and nations outside the geographic region. 
Recent studies and literature have focused on the period directly following the Asian Financial 
Crisis of 1997. The events of the period brought into question the predominant financial architecture.  
Many countries also experienced severe hardship from currency regime choices.  Movement to floating 
exchange rate regime has helped in terms of the major global currencies (yen, dollar, Euro) but led to 
other issues in an environment where intra-regional trade is expanding. These developments have 
brought renewed interest in the region for a shared currency primarily for the purposes of facilitating 
trade. Coordination of other goals associated with unification is proving more elusive despite financial 
architecture blueprints, annual meetings and agreements.   
Despite much coordination, significant differences exist in both qualitative and quantitative 
factors that will influence a regional, unitary monetary policy.  Unification of ASEAN nations is planned 
for 2020.  One of the most important qualitative measures contributing to effective monetary policy is 
central bank autonomy (CBA).  It is considered essential for strong macroeconomic performance.   
Ability to politically influence monetary policy is lessened in integration which is a boon for countries 
with histories of problematic central banks.  Many of the ASEAN+3 countries have long-standing systems 
similar to the EUCB or the US FED.   Interestingly enough, Brunei Darussalam does not have a central 
bank. Monetary policy is done through the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry’s Currency Board. 
A 2008 IMF study of CBA (Arnone et al, 2008) for select countries shows that there is varying 
degrees of autonomy for ASEAN central banks.  Banks in the study were rated for both political and 
economic autonomy and placed into separate and joint indexes.  Comparisons of ranks were made of 
two time periods.  Indexes were calculated for the late 1980s then compared with those at the end of 
2003. Overall progress is apparent but unity in purpose still appears elusive. 
Three countries of interest were placed in the category of advanced economies.  Japan scored a 
0.13 political, a 0.75 economic, and an overall CBA index of 0.44 for the end of 2003.  Korea was given a 
0.25 political, a 0.88 economic, and an overall CBA index of 0.56 for the same period.  Singapore was 
rated 0.38 in each of the three CBA measures.   Four of the ASEAN+3 countries were categorized as 
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emerging markets.  China’s CBA score was 0.38 for political, 0.75 for economic and 0.56 overall. 
Indonesia scored high with indexes of 0.63, 0.75, and 0.69 respectively. Malaysia’s indexes were 0.25 for 
political, 0.75 for economic, and 0.50 for overall autonomy. Thailand is also in this category.  Its indexes 
were 0.50, 0.38, and 0.44. 
Developing countries include Cambodia which scored 0.38, 0.75, and an overall of 0.56.  Lao 
PDR’s indexes were 0.13, 0.63, and 0.38. Myanmar also scored low with indexes given at 0.25, 0.50 and 
0.38. Vietnam came in with slightly higher rankings of 0.38 political, 0.50 economic, and 0.44.2  ASEAN 
finance ministers and central bankers meet annually to coordinate integration strategies and steps. 
   Member states vary on availability of monetary instruments and effective controls on their 
domestic banking industry (Mai, 2009).  Monetary integration will relieve the states of some of these 
considerations.  It will be stabilizing for financial markets and institutions but makes political 
commitment to a shared and independent central bank challenging.   The sophistication and depth of 
the banking and financial systems in the region is quite varied.  There has been a move towards 
liberalization since the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998.  Fewer states have dominant state banks but 
many still exist.  
The ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint provides guidance for financial system architecture 
as the region moves towards integration. The availability of financial services and institutions has 
increased but there remain distinct differences in some countries.  Myanmar has large state banks as 
well as commercial banks, investment banks, development banks, finance companies and credit 
societies.  It has had an organized capital market since 1996.  Brunei Darussalam has licensed nine 
banks—six that are foreign—that conduct business within the country.  There is one banking institution 
that provides Islamic banking services. As previously mentioned, Brunei Darussalam does not have a 
central bank but leaves monetary policy to the Ministry of Finance. There has been significant growth 
and deepening of financial markets in this country’s financial services industry. The country has one of 
the region’s more healthy banking systems and it has well-diversified non-bank financial institutions.  
Brunei Darussalam has joined a number of nations that license off-shore companies to attract 
multinational corporations.  This includes financial institutions. 
Vietnam has an extremely weak banking system.  The country has some distinct financial 
institutions.  There is a Development bank and a Social Policy Bank.  There are Join Venture banks, urban 
and rural joint stock commercial banks and State-owned Commercial banks.  Nonbank institutions 
include a Peoples’ Credit Fund System and finance and leasing companies.  Vietnam’s banks have 
                                                          
2
 All figures are from Table A1 of Appendix I of Amone, et al 2008. 
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numerous problems.  They have been non-compliant with Basel capital standards.  There is an absence 
of international auditing, a high level of non-performing loans, and general weakness in regulators and 
managers.  As a result, there is very low public confidence in Vietnamese banking institutions.  Vietnam 
has accomplished some technical upgrades that include ATMS and debit cards but because of many 
issues, the country still has a strong attachment to cash.  Like many of its contiguous neighbors, IT 
infrastructure is lacking throughout the country which makes payment systems difficult. 
Thailand has had a modern banking system since the World War 2 era.  There are commercial 
banks, retail banks, finance companies and asset management companies.  They are both foreign- and 
domestic-owned banks.   There are three state-owned commercial banks and five state-owned 
specialized banks.  Historically, Thai banks have had a high level of nonperforming assets which were 
particularly problematic after the Asian financial crisis.  The government has instituted a number of 
reforms and the number of troubled assets and institutions has been reduced.  It is still high, however, 
when compared to other nations and BASEL criteria. 
Differences in public financial instruments and financial institutions are important since this 
impacts the relationship between money demand, interest rates, and availability of credit.  In addition 
to Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia and Indonesia have also developed Islamic banking laws and institutions 
in addition to their traditional finance sector.  The Islamic banking sector in Malaysia represents about 
40 percent of the market.  Islamic financial institutions have prohibitions against usury and therefore 
treat interest rates differently.  This potentially creates a different relationship between money demand 
and interest rates in these countries. 
Indonesia has significantly restructured its banking system since recovering from the Asian 
Financial Crisis. It has changed from a system with central bank and government control of credit 
through state-owned banks to a much more diverse financial architecture based on market mechanisms.  
There are now tighter capital requirements and stronger regulation of bank lending practices more in 
line with BASEL requirements.  The central bank performs the usual functions as regulator of financial 
institutions. It also issues the state currency called the rupiah.  Banks are classified into commercial and 
rural banks and operate in the traditional role of financial intermediaries. Commercial banks are not 
involved directly in the payment systems and have restricted operating zones. Banks are further 
categorized as Sharia’h and non-Sharia’h-based. While the number of state-owned banks has shrunk, 
the government of Indonesia still maintains two state banks at this writing.  Continued modernization 
and liberalization is expected in keeping with the ASEAN blueprint. 
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Malaysia has worked had hard to develop an improved system of commercial banks, investment 
banks and Islamic banking institutions since the Asian Financial Crisis. They have both liberalized and 
diversified their financial architecture.  Malaysia’s banking sector has been considered fully liberalized 
since early 1991.   (Yee 2009)  Commercial banks freely set their base lending rates.  Malaysia has equity, 
money, foreign exchange, and bond markets.  There are also derivative markets that offer commodity 
and KLIBOR futures.  A full range of banking and nonbank financial institutions offer a range of savings, 
checking, and credit services. Malaysia has significantly enhanced its regulation of banks since the 
financial crisis.  Foreign as well as domestic financial institutions exist in the country. Malaysia is much 
more advanced in its progress towards the accepted ASEAN financial architecture than many of its 
counterparts. 
Lao PDR has more than 20 banks. Its State Bank has divided into a separate commercial bank 
and Central Bank with each providing the usual services.  There are also joint state-private commercial 
banks that are local and foreign-owned.  The government has also created several specialized banks that 
include a Joint Business bank with Vietnam and a bank that specifically services Lao’s agriculture sector.   
Lack of laws governing banking activities has generally discouraged foreign banks from possible 
ventures.  The small size of the Lao PDR economy is also a factor. The country has tried to pass 
legislation to create a better environment for foreign commercial banks but a clear regulatory 
framework is still lacking.  This country has a long way to go to develop a modern banking and financial 
market infrastructure. 
Cambodia is in the process of implementing its Financial Sector Blueprint with comprehensive 
economic and structural reforms.  The country has increased both its legal and regulatory framework for 
banking and financial systems.  As a result, the number of financial instruments in the country has 
increased.  One of the biggest problems in Cambodia is its large number of unbanked people and 
organizations.    Rural areas lack basic bank infrastructure and services.  Cash is still the preferred 
method of payment throughout the country.  There is no wholesale electronic payment system in the 
country and no interbank market exists.  Implementation of Basel regulations has been minimal and 
supervision is weak. There are foreign banks in the market but most are confined to the few large urban 
areas.  Microfinance institutions are more available but still rare in rural areas.  The banking sector is 
primarily privately owned and there are electronic banking services where large foreign bank branches 
are located. 
Singapore has a high degree of financial stability, bank efficiency, and commercial access to 
capital.  Its institutional laws and regulations, corporate governance, and contract enforcement are 
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considered some of the best in the world.  As a result, Singapore has highly developed banking 
institutions and financial services and markets.  The country serves as an offshore haven for many 
multinationals. Singapore does have issues with high public debt that carries risk of both sovereign and 
private debt crises. Like much of ASEAN, the city-state has underdeveloped bond markets.  The one area 
of concern in terms of BASEL standards is relatively weak financial disclosure.  It also heavily relies on 
centralized economic policy making. 
Increased exchange rate flexibility and labor and capital mobility is currently being implemented 
in the ASEAN region.  Theoretical unification criteria consider these positive steps.  The ASEAN Finance 
Ministers meeting (AFMM) held in Manila in 2003 endorsed a Roadmap for Monetary and Financial 
Integration of ASEAN (RIA-Fin).  This agreement lists steps, timelines and indicators of activities to 
enhance capital market development, liberalization of financial services and capital accounts and 
cooperation for a shared ASEAN currency.  Unification is planned for the year 2015.  Evidence shows—
ASEAN produces annual scorecards—that there is varying degree of success among countries in meeting 
the shared vision for modern banking and financial markets and institutions.  Qualitative descriptions of 
the region show that while much progress has been made, more progress is needed to successfully 
integrate by 2015.   
Quantitative measures can provide further insight into the possible disruptions that could occur 
in money and financial markets if the ASEAN region goes forward with its planned 2015 unification.  The 
empirical analysis part of this paper is divided into five sections.  Basic trends in money supply are 
examined in section 2.  Section 3 explores money multiplier estimates while Section 4 investigates the 
variation of velocity of circulation in member states.  Section 5 includes an estimate for the demand for 
money as well as demand elasticity with respect to relevant independent variables like domestic and 
international interest rates.  The last section concludes the paper with a summary of major findings. 
This paper studies the period of 1992-2009 which means data set covers the period of the Asian 
crisis (1997-1998) and the recent global financial crisis (2007-2008).  Data comes from the Asian 
Development Bank, the World Bank, and the IMF databases. 
 
Trends in Money Supply 
 
Table 2.1 shows select financial indicators for the member states of ASEAN+3.  The ratio of 
checking to M1 has generally increased for most member nations from the 1992 -2009 period.  This 
development stresses the diminishing role of money in the economies of many of these countries and 
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the deepening of their respective commercial banking system.  Nations can basically be sorted into two 
sets.  The ones with the most developed banking system from the 2007-2009 time frame are Brunei 
(77.32), Indonesia (56.54), Malaysia (78.28), the Philippines (61.05), Singapore (75 .74) and Vietnam 
(81.27).  The ratio of quasi money to M2 presented in Panel B is much lower in Myanmar and Vietnam 
than all other members.  This may be due to the nature of return on quasi money and the continued 
presence of State-owned banks. 
 
Table 2.1: Selected Average Financial Indicators for the ASEAN + 3 (%) 
 1992-94 1993-95 1996-98 1999-01 2001-03 2004-06 2007-09 
Panel A. Demand Deposit/M1     
ASEAN countries        
Brunei 82.18 83.65 80.68 72.16 70.23 77.49 77.32 
Cambodia 20.74 8.72 8.73 7.52 4.72 3.30 3.73 
Indonesia 62.87 60.03 62.79 57.10 57.59 55.51 56.54 
Lao 27.99 36.16 38.00 69.04 68.88 44.21 38.60 
Malaysia 58.72 64.47 67.03 68.09 73.50 75.68 78.28 
Myanmar 8.78 8.60 9.83 19.81 20.37 10.25 15.82 
Philippines 30.99 35.98 43.01 47.66 53.88 57.33 61.05 
Singapore 53.23 58.66 61.31 64.15 66.49 69.36 75.74 
Thailand 31.27 29.20 25.71 22.80 25.77 28.52 27.96 
Vietnam 48.81 43.78 56.70 63.98 68.31 75.42 81.27 
Plus 3        
China n/a n/a n/a 70.32 75.25 77.82 80.90 
Japan n/a n/a n/a n/a 85.95 84.28 84.05 
Korea 23.44 23.41 19.79 15.76 14.85 16.04 19.15 
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(Table 2.1 Continued) 
Panel B. Quasi Money/M2      
 1992-94 1993-95 1996-98 1999-01 2001-03 2004-06 2007-09 
ASEAN countries        
Brunei 49.43 48.10 57.81 68.82 76.14 75.57 72.41 
Cambodia 1.32 41.77 61.60 63.16 72.01 74.39 80.80 
Indonesia 69.95 74.80 77.29 81.17 77.94 76.19 74.85 
Lao 42.43 58.52 71.57 83.74 84.99 74.79 68.32 
Malaysia 75.66 71.53 75.59 79.33 76.92 79.75 79.41 
Myanmar 26.85 24.04 30.48 36.82 31.22 26.52 31.18 
Philippines 71.21 72.44 75.21 73.02 74.57 73.13 70.20 
Singapore 75.01 74.26 76.23 81.92 80.10 79.26 76.88 
Thailand 87.40 88.05 89.01 89.47 88.66 89.01 89.16 
Vietnam 36.78 25.12 21.42 27.06 27.92 23.00 19.99 
Plus 3        
China 50.91 53.67 60.67 59.86 59.62 62.08 63.64 
Japan 83.80 83.67 80.14 76.44 62.85 53.11 52.73 
Korea 75.48 74.72 78.45 87.13 88.19 86.48 86.12 
Panel C. Bank reserves/M2      
ASEAN countries        
Brunei n/a n/a n/a n/a 5.74 6.98 6.25 
Cambodia n/a n/a n/a n/a 39.50 29.91 32.47 
Indonesia n/a n/a n/a n/a 9.05 12.34 10.63 
Lao 5.24 21.00 22.06 27.05 26.87 18.11 21.26 
Malaysia n/a n/a n/a n/a 3.98 3.05 1.83 
Myanmar 47.50 -0.59 -3.37 9.74 7.55 7.05 6.13 
Philippines n/a n/a n/a n/a 6.66 8.87 18.03 
Singapore 6.80 6.86 6.98 4.66 4.26 3.98 4.22 
Thailand n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.76 0.71 0.57 
Vietnam n/a 13.52 15.49 11.10 7.53 7.16 7.81 
Plus 3        
China n/a n/a n/a 13.31 11.16 14.26 18.16 
Japan n/a n/a n/a n/a 2.93 3.43 1.89 
Korea 5.03 4.26 2.49 1.28 2.06 2.13 2.50 
52 
 
The behavior of the ratio of bank reserves to M2 differed substantially for ASEAN members over 
the period 1992-2009.  Cambodia (32.47), Lao PDR (21.26) and the Philippines (18.03) have extremely 
high ratios in line with the People’s Republic of China (18.16). China has recently used bank reserve 
requirements to tighten liquidity as a means to control inflation.  Thailand has an extremely low ratio 
(0.57) but it also was the sole country experiencing deflation in 2009.  Its annual percentage change in 
its CPI index was -.9%.   The three countries with relatively mild inflation in 2009 as measured by the 
annual percentage change in their CPI index were Vietnam (5.9%), Indonesia (4.8%) and the Philippines 
(3.2%).  All other ASEAN nations experienced inflation rates of 0% to 1.5% given the same measure of 
inflation. This may indicate that central bank policy over reserves may have little to do with the level of 
bank reserves.  The differences in the levels of inflation in some countries also indicate potential conflict 
in monetary policy goals. 
Data in Table 2.2 indicates that the latest ratio of claims on the private sector to GDP is much 
higher for Singapore (96.19), Thailand (93.99) and Vietnam (98.75) than any of the other ASEAN 
countries.  Still, their ratios are below that of China (112.84), Japan (102.36), or Korea 105.33). This ratio 
frequently proxies as a measure of the effectiveness of the credit channel.  This implies that monetary 
policy would have a more powerful impact on economic activities in these three high-ratio members and 
be less effective for those with low ratios. 
Table 2.2 Panel B show the ratio of claims on the public sector to GDP for the region.    Nearly all 
of the countries have negative numbers or slightly positive indication low reliance on domestic 
economic activities to finance their governments.  This is consistent with countries heavily reliant on 
export economies.   The public sector dominates the credit market in Japan.   The Philippines is the one 
country in the ASEAN region where public sector claims are positive and relatively large at 15.22.  
Indonesia is the other country that registers a positive and somewhat large number of 10.96. Both of 
these countries are modernizing their infrastructure. 
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Table 2.2: Average Ratios of Domestic Claims for ASEAN + 3 (%) 
 1992-94 1993-95 1996-98 1999-01 2001-03 2004-06 2007-09 
Panel A. Claims on Private Sector/GDP     
ASEAN countries        
Brunei n/a n/a n/a n/a 52.72 40.50 37.18 
Cambodia n/a 2.85 4.83 5.89 6.51 10.00 22.04 
Indonesia 36.48 39.89 58.63 34.89 21.51 25.81 25.70 
Lao 1.66 6.84 10.36 9.99 8.09 6.49 10.96 
Malaysia n/a n/a n/a n/a 9.13 8.46 7.71 
Myanmar 4.67 6.69 9.14 9.57 8.99 4.72 n/a 
Philippines 18.24 24.91 46.86 42.48 37.35 31.35 30.23 
Singapore 83.56 84.67 96.75 106.36 112.41 92.56 96.19 
Thailand 67.45 83.47 109.92 106.70 99.98 99.28 93.99 
Vietnam 1.41 12.48 19.00 27.86 43.60 65.26 98.75 
Plus 3        
China 84.80 90.58 90.95 109.99 119.09 114.70 112.84 
Japan n/a n/a n/a n/a 107.23 99.75 102.36 
Korea 53.68 53.53 57.86 73.83 86.88 89.07 105.33 
        
Panel B. Claims on Government Sector/GDP      
ASEAN countries        
Brunei n/a n/a n/a n/a -18.61 -25.21 -19.32 
Cambodia n/a 2.29 1.22 0.77 -0.58 -2.05 -6.05 
Indonesia -5.56 -4.82 -5.07 23.55 30.13 19.20 10.92 
Lao 3.61 0.31 0.52 1.23 2.46 1.02 -0.11 
Malaysia 4.79 0.86 -3.20 -5.44 2.97 0.44 3.71 
Myanmar 35.81 27.91 22.46 19.16 19.13 20.04 n/a 
Philippines 3.47 11.64 18.08 17.44 19.77 18.16 15.22 
Singapore -21.04 -25.18 -29.97 -21.75 -27.93 -26.15 -17.28 
Thailand -1.33 -6.51 -9.51 1.34 11.36 7.60 6.31 
Vietnam 7.38 3.51 1.48 0.83 1.84 4.25 5.82 
Plus 3        
China 2.13 3.29 2.62 6.07 10.28 8.36 9.84 
Japan n/a n/a n/a n/a 58.29 67.11 72.72 
Korea 0.62 0.84 0.32 2.80 1.58 3.84 3.51 
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Table 2.2 (continued) 
 1992-94 1993-95 1996-98 1999-01 2001-03 2004-06 2007-09 
Panel C. Claims on Government Sector/Total claims     
ASEAN countries        
Brunei n/a n/a n/a n/a -55.71 -178.80 -144.68 
Cambodia n/a n/a n/a n/a -9.76 -25.16 -38.41 
Indonesia n/a n/a n/a n/a 57.76 41.72 28.75 
Lao 65.95 1.46 1.39 9.33 22.97 13.20 4.95 
Malaysia n/a n/a n/a n/a 2.81 0.44 3.54 
Myanmar 88.66 77.30 69.52 66.00 68.80 80.78 83.38 
Philippines n/a n/a n/a n/a 33.80 34.79 30.35 
Singapore -33.66 -42.39 -45.17 -25.70 -33.45 -39.67 -22.59 
Thailand n/a n/a n/a n/a 8.81 6.40 5.89 
Vietnam n/a 19.75 7.23 3.55 3.80 6.08 5.30 
Plus 3        
China 2.42 3.51 2.81 5.17 7.43 6.13 7.54 
Japan n/a n/a n/a n/a 24.46 29.45 32.32 
Korea 1.13 1.55 0.49 3.70 1.80 4.09 3.19 
 
The significant factor in the series is the amount of variation in these ratios which has strong 
implications for the formation of a monetary union.  These differences suggest that some countries will 
have an easier time financing government borrowing than others under unification.  Additionally, the 
extent to which the credit channel effectively transmits monetary policy will also vary from country to 
country.  A central monetary authority will not be as concerned with the plight of an individual country 
and will be more concerned with the well-being of the overall region.  This might require a higher 
degree of political cooperation among the nations should cross border fiscal policy become necessary to 
help weaker members.   This political challenge is currently working itself out in the Eurozone and has 
shown to be a major source of friction and volatility in markets. 
 
Money Multipliers 
 
The money supply multiplier for a country determines the stability of the relationship between 
the supply of money and the monetary base.  Even though the effectiveness of monetary policy can be 
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discounted in the long term, the economy will respond as monetary policy funnels into the economy 
through its transmission channels on a regional basis in the short run.  The level of growth resulting from 
policy will differ if each member state is affected in a significantly asymmetric way.  Uneven economic 
outcomes can cast serious doubts on the benefits of each member and their commitment to the 
common monetary policy and strategy.   
The performance of the monetary sector among ASEAN members may be evaluated through the 
money multiplier.  The following definitions are given to examine money multipliers for the ASEAN+3 
countries. 
 
    C = currency in circulation 
  D1 =  demand deposits 
  D2 =  time and saving deposits 
  R  =  bank reserves 
 
The following ratios are defined for each ASEAN member over the period 1992-2009: 
               = C / D1              (2.1) 
 = D2 / D1              (2.2) 
 = R / (D1 + D2)             (2.3) 
 
The money multiplier k is defined as: 
  k = M / B              (2.4) 
Where 
  M = stock of money (M1 or M2) 
  B  = monetary base or C + R 
 
Substituting the above ratios in the definition of the multiplier provides the following equations: 
  k = M /B = M / (C + R) = (C + D1) / (C + R) 
  k = (1 + ) / [ (1 + ) + ]            (2.5) 
 
Resultant values for the above equations are reported in Table 2.3.    The results for α in Panel A 
suggest that people in Myanmar (5.33) and Thailand (2.52) have very high preferences for currency in 
comparison with other ASEAN nations.  Lao PDR, Vietnam, and Cambodia also have relatively high 
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preferences for currency. This is most likely related to weak financial institutions that have not 
developed enough to provide coverage to the more traditional and rural parts of their economies.  
 
Table 2.3: Money ratios and money multiplier for ASEAN+3 
This shows 3-year averages of money ratios and 3-year averages of money multiplier for the ASEAN+3 countries. Alpha (α) is 
the ratio of currency in circulation to demand deposit, beta (β) is the ratio of time and saving deposit to demand deposit , 
gamma (γ) is the ratio bank reserves to total deposits (demand plus time and saving deposits), and the kappa (k) is the money 
multiplier defined as the ratio stock of money to base money.  
 
 1992-94 1993-95 1996-98 1999-01 2001-03 2004-06 2007-09 
Panel A. Alpha (α)     
ASEAN countries        
Brunei 0.22 0.20 0.25 0.39 0.23 0.20 0.20 
Cambodia 4.03 11.07 10.60 12.50 21.94 0.73 1.05 
Indonesia 0.59 0.67 0.59 0.76 0.51 0.54 0.55 
Lao 2.64 1.78 1.66 0.47 0.66 1.47 1.60 
Malaysia 0.70 0.56 0.49 0.47 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Myanmar 14.47 10.63 9.21 3.95 5.98 8.20 5.33 
Philippines 2.23 1.78 1.33 1.10 0.84 0.73 0.62 
Singapore 0.88 0.71 0.63 0.56 0.50 0.44 0.32 
Thailand 2.21 2.43 2.93 3.53 2.99 2.44 2.52 
Vietnam 1.05 2.29 2.25 1.45 1.42 1.20 1.10 
        
Plus 3        
China 0.70 0.61 0.47 0.41 0.33 0.28 0.24 
Japan n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.23 0.18 0.18 
Korea 0.68 0.63 0.69 0.67 0.48 0.40 0.40 
        
Panel B. Beta (β)      
ASEAN countries        
Brunei n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.97 1.85 1.72 
Cambodia n/a 0.69 0.30 0.78 58.52 1.19 3.60 
Indonesia 3.16 3.82 4.05 5.79 3.87 3.56 3.47 
Lao 2.77 3.97 7.48 7.67 8.18 6.83 5.37 
Malaysia 3.36 3.35 3.82 4.90 0.02 0.00 0.03 
57 
 
Table 2.3 (continued) 
 2007-09 2007-09 2007-09 2007-09 2007-09 2007-09 2007-09 
Myanmar 6.10 3.80 4.73 3.04 2.87 3.45 2.89 
Philippines 7.64 7.34 7.08 5.71 8.05 6.80 5.08 
Singapore 5.65 4.96 5.25 7.11 6.06 5.51 4.43 
Thailand 23.25 24.47 21.12 39.28 36.25 28.52 28.13 
Vietnam 1.28 1.18 1.22 1.22 1.61 2.43 3.50 
        
Plus 3        
China 1.88 1.79 2.13 2.02 1.95 2.21 2.16 
Japan n/a n/a n/a n/a 2.18 1.34 1.34 
Korea 5.14 4.79 6.44 11.40 11.06 9.05 8.92 
 
 1992-94 1993-95 1996-98 1999-01 2001-03 2004-06 2007-09 
Panel C. Gamma (γ)      
ASEAN countries        
Brunei n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.06 0.07 0.07 
Cambodia n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.54 0.40 0.40 
Indonesia n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.10 0.14 0.12 
Lao 0.09 0.29 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.22 0.26 
Malaysia n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.03 0.03 0.02 
Myanmar 1.43 -0.01 -0.09 0.19 0.17 0.20 0.15 
Philippines n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.05 0.06 0.13 
Singapore 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 
Thailand n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Vietnam n/a 0.45 0.39 0.25 0.16 0.12 0.12 
        
Plus 3        
China 0.23 0.21 0.22 0.16 0.13 0.16 0.20 
Japan n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.02 0.02 0.01 
Korea 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 
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Table 2.3 (continued) 
 1992-94 1993-95 1996-98 1999-01 2001-03 2004-06 2007-09 
Panel D.  kappa (κ) (money multiplier)     
ASEAN countries        
Brunei n/a n/a n/a n/a 2.99 2.93 3.18 
Cambodia n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.42 1.09 0.72 
Indonesia n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.51 1.32 1.44 
Lao 1.23 0.87 0.71 0.51 0.50 0.78 0.79 
Malaysia n/a n/a n/a n/a 12.56 12.22 14.20 
Myanmar 0.67 1.11 1.18 1.06 1.13 1.01 1.07 
Philippines n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.44 1.45 1.17 
Singapore 1.35 1.47 1.47 1.63 1.82 2.01 2.36 
Thailand n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.21 1.29 1.30 
Vietnam n/a 1.05 1.05 1.22 1.32 1.36 1.29 
        
Plus 3        
China 1.24 1.34 1.26 1.57 1.85 1.64 1.45 
Japan n/a n/a n/a n/a 4.21 4.98 5.45 
Korea 1.23 1.32 1.48 1.66 1.64 1.74 1.49 
 
Strong differences are evident even while the ratio of currency to demand deposits has 
decreased over time for many ASEAN member countries. This has a number of implications for 
monetary policy.  If a small number of a country’s transactions or investments are financed at local 
interest rates then changes to policy rates are unlikely to have much of an impact on the economies of 
those countries.  Monetary policy will be highly constrained in these countries compared to the others.  
There will also be differences in the credit channel.  This is significant because constrained lending 
means slower growth in businesses. 
Another important implication can be seen in the ratio of time deposits to demand deposits (). 
This ratio is extremely high in Thailand (28.13). Malaysia’s ratio is practically zero which may have 
something to do with the strong presence of Islamic Financial Intuitions with their prohibition on usury. 
Brunei Darussalam is the other nation with a low ratio (1.72).  Ratios have generally fluctuated in all 
countries over the time period. Ratios generally increased during and after the Asian Financial Crisis and 
have mostly declined since then.  The  ratio depends—among other things—on the interest rates paid 
on saving accounts and time deposits (in both domestic and foreign currencies). It is also related to the 
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interest paid on other competitive alternatives (Friedman, 1970).  Saving and time deposits have been 
losing ground recently as interest rates on quasi money declined.   Varying ratios imply differences in 
interest elasticity of demand. 
Cambodia (0.40) and Lao PDR (0.26) have much higher ratios of reserves to total deposits () 
compared with other ASEAN members. Lao PDR’s ratio is most similar to the People’s Republic of China 
(.20).  Thailand’s ratio (0.01) is extremely low and matches that of Japan. The other countries’ ratios are 
scattered between those numbers.  The ratio of reserves to total deposits depends on the reserve 
requirements for demand and time deposits for countries with private commercial banks as they are 
likely to expand their loans to the maximum level permitted by their reserve assets.   
These very different results suggest that much work must be done to bring standardization to 
the commercial banking industry within the proposed monetary union.  These structural differences 
could cause capital to flow inefficiently between nations.  The flows may be more based on the banking 
law and structure early on in the union rather than the actual demands by a country’s economy for 
investment.  It is evidence of the uneven financial market development and inconsistent central bank 
policies that were outlined in the qualitative description of this paper. 
Model results shown in Panel D indicate large differences in money multipliers (κ) of the 
ASEAN+3 countries during the period.  Malaysia shows evidence of an extremely large money multiplier 
(14.20) that has been increasing.  Brunei Darussalam (3.18) and Singapore (2.36) also have larger money 
multipliers—although nowhere near the size of Japan (5.45)—when compared to the other countries.  
This undoubtedly reflects their more developed banking and finance markets.  Cambodia (0.72) and Lao 
PDR (.79) have the smallest money multipliers.  Most of the other countries have multipliers in line with 
those of the Republic of Korea and China.  This extreme variation suggests that application of a unified 
monetary policy for an integrated union would present difficulties.   
Domestic liquidity is another important aspect to consider when looking at differences in 
monetary policies of countries.  Table 2.4 shows how domestic liquidity is different across member 
states.  Net foreign assets can have a diverse and heterogeneous influence on domestic liquidity.  Net 
foreign assets have been more stable and have induced an increase in money supply in Singapore 
(99.10), Brunei Darussalam (43.98), and Thailand (46.05.) This item has been a less stable source of 
funds in the other members.  This is especially true of Myanmar which has a negative number. The 
Domestic Credit numbers may reveal an underlying difference in degree of sensitivity of the money 
supply to capital inflow and preferences by banks. The presence of sharia’h compliant banking and 
finance institutions an also affect this measure since there is a prohibition against usury. A central 
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monetary authority must consider these variations in net foreign assets when employing various 
monetary policy strategies since policies feed into the money multiplier. 
 
Table 2.4: Factors affecting domestic liquidity (% of GDP) for ASEAN+3 
 1992-94 1993-95 1996-98 1999-01 2001-03 2004-06 2007-09 
Panel A. Net Foreign Assets/GDP     
ASEAN countries        
Brunei n/a n/a n/a n/a 52.30 51.84 43.98 
Cambodia n/a n/a n/a n/a 20.74 22.39 29.13 
Indonesia n/a n/a n/a n/a 12.96 11.17 12.35 
Lao 2.10 4.82 7.20 10.69 10.49 12.15 16.82 
Malaysia n/a n/a n/a n/a 19.71 20.84 22.31 
Myanmar -8.01 -3.23 -1.41 -0.48 -0.20 -0.12  
Philippines n/a n/a n/a n/a 16.96 20.48 27.96 
Singapore 73.89 80.41 68.81 85.42 87.69 94.49 99.10 
Thailand n/a n/a n/a n/a 28.26 34.52 46.05 
Vietnam n/a 7.26 5.31 14.94 22.36 23.62 26.52 
        
Plus 3        
China 8.68 9.01 13.54 19.00 26.07 40.71 55.41 
Japan n/a n/a n/a n/a 7.40 9.83 12.60 
Korea 4.98 5.59 4.58 15.83 20.95 21.86 16.20 
        
Panel B. Domestic credit/GDP      
ASEAN countries        
Brunei n/a n/a n/a n/a 34.26 15.75 18.52 
Cambodia n/a n/a n/a n/a 5.93 8.02 16.06 
Indonesia n/a n/a n/a n/a 52.02 45.83 37.64 
Lao 5.27 7.15 10.87 11.22 10.55 7.52 8.49 
Malaysia n/a n/a n/a n/a 104.97 97.23 99.12 
Myanmar 40.60 36.14 32.27 29.01 28.26 24.84 n/a 
Philippines n/a n/a n/a n/a 58.54 52.06 50.16 
Singapore 62.53 59.50 66.79 84.61 84.49 66.41 78.91 
Thailand n/a n/a n/a n/a 129.03 117.53 106.75 
Vietnam n/a 19.09 20.48 28.68 45.44 69.51 104.57 
        
Plus 3        
China 86.93 93.87 93.92 117.37 139.44 136.05 131.28 
Japan n/a n/a n/a n/a 238.34 227.92 224.20 
Korea 54.30 54.37 58.18 76.64 88.46 92.90 108.84 
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Trends in Velocity 
 
The behavior of velocity interests financial economists.  This is because of the relationship 
between money supply and the level of economic activities as expressed by the Equation of Exchange 
(MV=PY).  If velocity is constant, money supply connects directly to economic activities.  Conversely, if 
velocity fluctuates in an unpredictable manner, monetary authorities find it difficult to influence or 
predict the change in GDP as money supply changes.  The predictability of the value of velocity 
contributes to the effectiveness of monetary policy for inflation targeting and stimulus.  The 
predictability of velocity also influences the effectiveness of fiscal policy.  Fiscal policy will be an effective 
policy tool if velocity increases whenever government expenditures increase and decreases as 
expenditures decline.  
The essential aspect of the monetarists’ view is the assumption that velocity—rather than the 
multiplier—is the key to understanding microeconomic development in the economy (Bomberger, 
1993).  The Quantity Theory of Money (QTM) has been suggested as the most applicable hypothesis for 
analyzing monetary problems in less developed economies.  QTM relies on stability of income and 
velocity when using its straightforward accounting identity.  Practical considerations make this simplicity 
desirable since monetary authorities can base their decisions on a clear-cut hypothesis like the constant 
velocity of money (Friedman, 1970).   It can be assumed that changes in the money supply and velocity 
are important transmitters of both policies since economists have found that money neutrality (the 
competing hypothesis to the quantity theory of money which says changes in the money supply do not 
cause changes in income) does not hold in the short run.  This has important ramifications that can apply 
to short run business cycle management.   
Large values for V are conceptually a characteristic of an economy with an efficient financial 
sector because V can depend on how quickly a bank can turn a deposit into a loan.  Velocity also reflects 
how quickly banks can shift deposits and loans between themselves.  In this sense, it is akin to a 
turnover ratio in the monetary sector.  Many rural areas in developing countries are not covered by 
sophisticated banking systems and therefore maybe outside the reach of the benefits of a modern 
financial system.  Any sustained increased in V reflects positive technology changes and functioning in 
banking and financial markets which can mean that more of the economy and its businesses are being 
brought into the modern sector.   
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Velocity may also depend on confidence in the banking system and between banks.  Confidence 
and trust must exist between banks in and outside the country’s borders when systems are integrated in 
a monetary union.     Velocity also relates to existence of the fractional reserve system and is positively 
related to the money multiplier.  A common behavior of velocity is important when consolidating the 
ASEAN region into a single economic block heading toward a unified monetary policy.  It is important for 
a change in money supply to have a similar impact on economic activity in each member state.   
Systemic decreases in velocity can reflect problems within the banking system or with confidence 
surrounding the banking system.  Velocity instability or weakness can result in limited influence of 
economic policies on countries with disadvantaged banking systems. 
There are different measures of income velocity that depend on how money is defined and what 
concept of income is used.  The three measures used are: 
 
V1 = income velocity of currency outside banks 
V2 = income velocity of M1 
V3 = income velocity of M2 
where: 
             V1 = (Y/C) 
             V2 = (Y/M1) 
             V3 = (Y/M2)  
and 
                         Y = nominal GDP or GNI 
                         C = currency outside banks 
                        M1 = demand deposits plus currency outside banks 
                        M2 = M1 plus quasi money 
 
The variability of V1, V2, and V3 is calculated by the degree of dispersion of each velocity value 
around its mean value.  To measure this concept, the coefficient of variation for each V1, V2, and V3 is 
computed using data covering the period 1992-2009 and is based on the availability of published data 
for some variables.  Note that gross national income, GNI, or GDP were used depending on data 
availability.  Results are given in Table 2.5 and show that the coefficients of variation of velocity differ 
substantially among ASEAN+3 according to this definition.   
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Table 2.5: Income velocity for ASEAN + 3 
 1992-94 1993-95 1996-98 1999-01 2001-03 2004-06 2007-09 
Panel A. Income velocity of currency  outside banks (V1=Y/C)   
ASEAN countries        
Brunei n/a n/a n/a n/a 18.67 25.98 26.54 
Cambodia n/a n/a n/a n/a 22.97 19.20 16.71 
Indonesia n/a n/a n/a n/a 21.82 21.87 23.35 
Lao 31.76 30.89 38.43 133.72 91.97 33.16 21.96 
Malaysia n/a n/a n/a n/a 16.12 17.03 17.23 
Myanmar 5.46 5.09 5.41 7.41 7.33 6.74 n/a 
Philippines n/a n/a n/a n/a 19.20 19.81 17.68 
Singapore 9.41 10.58 12.68 13.38 12.79 14.31 14.50 
Thailand n/a n/a n/a n/a 11.59 11.92 12.13 
Vietnam n/a 10.16 12.11 10.51 7.08 6.36 5.70 
        
Plus 3        
China 7.06 6.32 7.85 6.99 6.94 7.77 8.94 
Japan n/a n/a n/a n/a 7.08 6.73 6.48 
Korea 26.80 26.64 29.10 32.27 36.42 39.45 38.44 
Panel B. Income velocity of narrow money (V2=Y/M1)   
ASEAN countries        
Brunei n/a n/a n/a 3.27 3.45 4.27 4.81 
Cambodia n/a 34.33 28.21 24.27 21.88 18.72 17.23 
Indonesia 8.96 9.45 9.20 9.52 9.69 9.74 9.81 
Lao 22.19 19.75 23.83 37.28 33.53 19.50 13.16 
Malaysia 4.77 3.77 3.47 4.50 4.33 4.21 4.04 
Myanmar 5.04 4.65 4.87 5.85 5.71 6.10 n/a 
Philippines 11.52 10.78 9.41 8.48 8.62 8.39 7.55 
Singapore 4.40 4.36 4.90 4.79 4.29 4.38 3.54 
Thailand 11.35 11.35 11.74 9.94 8.63 8.40 8.94 
Vietnam n/a 7.49 8.30 6.23 4.15 3.47 3.03 
Plus 3        
China 2.67 2.34 2.49 1.97 1.70 1.70 1.72 
Japan 3.24 3.10 2.36 1.77 1.33 1.03 1.03 
Korea 10.98 10.32 11.87 12.79 11.77 11.29 10.82 
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Table 2.5 (continued) 
 1992-94 1993-95 1996-98 1999-01 2001-03 2004-06 2007-09 
Panel C. Income velocity of broad money (V3=Y/M2)   
ASEAN countries        
Brunei n/a n/a n/a 1.23 1.33 1.69 1.85 
Cambodia n/a 18.07 10.88 8.83 6.14 4.82 3.32 
Indonesia 2.67 2.28 1.91 1.75 2.06 2.32 2.51 
Lao 12.67 8.26 6.60 5.87 5.56 5.15 4.18 
Malaysia 1.28 0.92 0.83 0.79 0.76 0.81 0.83 
Myanmar 3.63 3.51 3.32 3.60 3.87 4.36 n/a 
Philippines 2.95 2.41 1.77 1.60 1.71 1.83 1.84 
Singapore 1.10 1.12 1.16 0.87 0.85 0.91 0.81 
Thailand 1.33 1.20 1.12 0.88 0.86 0.91 0.99 
Vietnam n/a 4.71 4.79 3.04 1.81 1.30 1.04 
        
Plus 3        
China 1.31 1.09 0.98 0.79 0.69 0.65 0.63 
Japan 0.52 0.51 0.47 0.42 0.48 0.48 0.49 
Korea 2.69 2.61 2.51 1.65 1.39 1.52 1.50 
 
Myanmar (6.74) and Vietnam (5.70) had the lowest coefficients of variation for V1. Their 
coefficients are similar to those of China (8.94) and Japan (6.48).  The countries with the highest 
coefficients of variation for V1 were Brunei Darussalam (26.54), Indonesia (23.35), Lao PDR (21.96) and 
the Philippines (17.23).  These measurements were still not as high as those of the Republic of South 
Korea (38.44). The majority of countries showed upward historical trends with the exceptions of 
Vietnam, Lao PDR and Cambodia.  These differences likely reflect variations in the relative growth of 
currency, demand deposits, and quasi-money in various member countries.  A major finding is that all 
measures of velocity have shown a relatively large degree of instability.    
The high coefficients of variation in velocity among some of the ASEAN countries may be 
attributed to a number of factors.  First, many members of ASEAN are dependent on agricultural, mining 
and manufacturing exports which makes their income vulnerable to fluctuations that are difficult for 
policy makers to combat.  Countries reliant on agriculture and mineral extraction see volatility in prices. 
Manufacturing is more subject to business downturns.  Also, all countries have experienced substantial, 
overall increases in GNI over time.  Velocity, therefore, will change as income changes and money supply 
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will not follow with the same magnitude.  Some of the ASEAN countries have better smoothed the 
impact of fluctuations in income than others by relying on reserves and public borrowing. This is one 
potentially successful strategy.   
 Second, ASEAN countries may be subject to greater discrepancies between current and 
permanent income as a result of fluctuations and overall increases in income. This implies greater 
variability in velocity in some countries than others.  Velocity tends to rise in periods when measured 
income is above permanent income.  The opposite is also true (Park, 1973).   
Third, the variability in velocity may also be due in part to variability in the lag in the adjustment 
of income money.  This variability may be due to the source of exchange in money (e.g. the 
government’s borrowing from the central bank, the supply of bank loans, etc.).  Shifts in confidence and 
expectations can come from largely non-quantifiable factors related to psychological, sociological and 
political attributes. These items may also account for observed variations in velocity. Changes in these 
expectations may have been triggered by the Asian Financial Crisis or abrupt changes in regimes like 
those in Myanmar.   
Fourth, there may be a host of other miscellaneous factors affecting the behavior of velocity in 
ASEAN+3 countries.  Traditionally, variables that impact demand for real balances include things like 
changes in expected rates of inflation, nominal interest rates, or real income and its structure.  In 
addition, the introduction of financial innovations like the availability of new money substitutes or new 
methods of payments can contribute to the variability of velocity (Palivos and Wange, 1995; Duca, 1995; 
Feinman and Porter, 1992; Chowdhury and Wheeler, 1999).  Some countries have been quicker to adapt 
to modern financial systems than others. 
These results suggest that basing monetary policy on TQM or even the Taylor Rule may not be 
advantageous for the time being.  This is because circumstances in the region may not permit reliance 
on the crude QTM or a time trend analysis of velocity.  Such analysis would likely be subject to 
substantial error. 
 
Trends in the Demand for Money 
  
Performance of the monetary sectors of ASEAN+3 countries may also be assessed by examining 
the demand for money function and estimating elasticity.  Money demand stability is a vital prerequisite 
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to implementing effective monetary policy for either a single economy or an economic block in with 
coordinated monetary policy.  The literature on money demand is extensive because of this reason.3 
Theory states that the demand for real cash balances (M/p) will be positively related to real 
income (Y) and negatively related to yield on alternative assets (financial and/or real).  Real interest 
rates may be used to represent the yield on financial assets (Arango and Nadiri, 1981; Baba et al., 1992).  
The equation of money demand should capture opportunity costs of holding money balances in 
alternative currencies whether locally or internationally (Campbell, 1996; Ericsson et al., 1998) since 
ASEAN+3 members are open economies and are characterized by an increasing degree of international 
capital mobility. This requirement should particularly be true for members lacking adequate domestic 
financial assets where wealth maybe held.  Thus, it can be assumed that the demand for money in these 
countries would be influenced by international monetary development reflected in movements of 
foreign interest rates.  
 In this analysis, the demand for money function takes the conventional form of: 
              M/p = f (Y, i, r) 
Where: 
     (M/p) / Y > 0 
    (M/p) / i < 0 
  (M/p) / r < 0 
 
Three equations are tested for each member4:     
 Model (1):  (M1/P)t  =  α 0+ α 1Yt+ α 2 i t+ α 3 rt+ ut          (2.6) 
 Model (2):  (M2/P)t  =  β0+ β1 Yt + β2 it + β3  rt + ut             (2.7) 
 Model (3):   (C/P)t  =   λ0  + λ 1 Yt + λ 2 it  + λ 3  rt  + ut          (2.8) 
  
where: 
(M1/P)t  = volume of real money (M1) in period t 
(M2/P)t  = volume of real money (M2) in period t 
(C/P)t  = volume of real money (M2) in period t 
Yt = real GDP in period t 
                                                          
3 For a survey on money demand, see Sriram (2001). 
4 A log-linear model was tested but proved to be inferior in terms of AIC criterion. Also partial adjustment mechanism was tested but did not 
give better results. Also, due to lack of data (only 19 annual observations were used), it was not possible to use cointegration analysis 
(Patterson, 2000)  
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it   = real domestic interest rate in period t  
rt  = one-year London inter-bank offer rate on US dollar deposits in period t 
 
These equations were estimated using data from the International Financial Statistics of the 
International Monetary Fund and the Asian Development Bank.  The models were estimated using the 
method of ordinary least-squares.  Some models were re-estimated using a variant of generalized least 
squares in cases where there were apparent problems in serial correlation in the spirit of Greene (2000).  
The coefficients for the real GDP, ((M/p) / Y) are significant and positive for all countries—as 
expected—with the exception of Brunei Darussalam which had a negative but not significant 
relationship.   Coefficients for domestic interest rates were positive and significant for all countries but 
Brunei Darussalam which had a negative but not significant relationship.  Coefficients for international 
interest rates (rt) showed  a mixture of positive and negative signs with varying levels of significance 
((M/p)/r < 0).   Cambodia, People’s Republic of China, Korea, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand had coefficients with negative signs.  China, Singapore and Thailand had 
negative significant relationships.  Negative signs imply that the demand for money in these countries is 
influenced by international monetary development while the others are not influenced by international 
monetary developments. 
The values of R2 suggest that the model is a good fit for all countries but Brunei Darussalam.  The 
values of DW statistics clear the fit from any serious problem of serial correlation.    The regression 
results in Table2.6-A suggest that real income—as expected—is a major of determinant of the demand 
for narrow money all ASEAN+3 countries but Brunei Darussalam.  The t value of the coefficient 1 is 
significant at the 1 percent level of significance in all cases except Japan and Brunei Darussalam.   Japan 
is significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 2.6A Regression results for narrow money (M1) for ASEAN+3 
Table shows the statistics for the AR1 regression: (M1/P)t  =  α 0  + α 1 Yt + α 2 i
 
t  + α 3  rt  +(M1/P)t-1+ ut, 
where(M1/p) = logarithm of narrow money (M1) in period t, Yt = logarithm of real GDP in period t, it   = real 
domestic interest rate in period t, and rt  = one-year London inter-bank offer rate on US dollar deposits in period t. 
***, **, and * denotes significant level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Coefficient standard errors are in 
parenthesis. 
      Adj. R2 DW Obs. 
Brunei Darussalam 23.408***  
(4.7000) 
-0.074  
(.2020) 
-0.007  
(.0058) 
0.016  
(.0335) 
0.283  
(.2530) 
0.02 1.89 18 
Cambodia -20.951***  
(3.3000) 
1.588***  
(.1070) 
0.001  
(.0061) 
-0.026  
(.0166) 
0.208  
(.2870) 
0.97 1.75 16 
China -7.085***  
(1.3100) 
1.215***  
(.0431) 
0.007*  
(.0038) 
-0.019*  
(.0103) 
0.610***  
(.1610) 
0.99 1.62 24 
Indonesia -0.542  
(2.5600) 
0.950***  
(.0717) 
0.003**  
(.0015) 
0.015  
(.0103) 
0.467**  
(.2160) 
0.96 1.72 20 
Japan -171.630  
(105.0000) 
6.020*  
(3.1000) 
0.113  
(.2400) 
0.134  
(.1100) 
0.483*  
(.2650) 
0.09 1.24 25 
Korea 2.650  
(2.3100) 
0.857***  
(.0671) 
-0.014*  
(.0081) 
-0.011  
(.0126) 
0.482**  
(.1950) 
0.96 1.57 24 
Lao -19.802  
(12.4000) 
1.541***  
(.4010) 
0.005*  
(.0030) 
0.004  
(.0321) 
0.815***  
(.1200) 
0.85 1.44 19 
Malaysia -7.170***  
(1.5000) 
1.214***  
(.0549) 
0.011***  
(.0038) 
-0.004  
(.0100) 
0.205  
(.2240) 
0.98 1.86 20 
Myanmar 5.756  
(3.7500) 
0.750***  
(.1250) 
0.000  
(.0027) 
-0.001  
(.0174) 
0.172  
(.2590) 
0.86 1.71 15 
Philippines -20.655***  
(3.4500) 
1.636***  
(.1180) 
-0.003  
(.0073) 
-0.009  
(.0117) 
0.461**  
(.2120) 
0.97 1.81 20 
Singapore -1.559  
(2.7700) 
1.013***  
(.1080) 
0.003  
(.0045) 
-0.036***  
(.0110) 
0.861***  
(.1070) 
0.98 1.20 25 
Thailand -6.483  
(8.8400) 
1.144***  
(.3010) 
0.016***  
(.0050) 
-0.018*  
(.0102) 
0.869***  
(.1660) 
0.96 1.19 20 
Vietnam -55.960***  
(2.2000) 
2.616***  
(.0636) 
-0.005  
(.0033) 
0.004  
(.0128) 
0.082  
(.3000) 
0.99 1.86 15 
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Table 2.6B reports the regression results for broad money. The values of R2 suggest a better fit 
than that of narrow money in the previous case in all cases except Japan.  The values of DW statistics 
suggest no serious problems of serial correlation.   All countries now show a positive relationship with 
real GDP for a broad definition of money.  Countries with the expected coefficient sign whose Domestic 
interest rates significantly impact money demand are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, People’s Republic 
of China, and Malaysia.  Singapore has a significant relationship but the coefficient has a positive sign. 
This is a surprising result.    
 The statistical results of Table 2.6B suggest that demand for broad money in ASEAN members is 
strongly influenced—as expected—by real income. Financial markets offering substitutability between 
money and other financial assets are developing rapidly in only a few ASEAN member countries. This 
conclusion can be drawn by comparing these results with those for narrow money.   International 
interest rates exert a significant influence on the demand for broad money in a few members.  This 
suggests that international opportunity costs of holding money balances are as important as the 
domestic counterpart in those countries.  The significant influence of international interest rates on the 
demand for broad money (M2) in the economies of these ASEAN countries may also be attributed to the 
fact that international capital flows are not subject to major governmental control. 
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Table 2.6B: Regression results for broad money (M2) in the ASEAN+3 
Table shows the statistics for the AR1 regression: (M2/P)t  =  α 0  + α 1 Yt + α 2 i
 
t  + α 3  rt  +(M2/P)t-1+ ut, 
where(M2/p) = logarithm of narrow money (M2) in period t, Yt = logarithm of real GDP in period t, it   = real 
domestic interest rate in period t, and rt  = one-year London inter-bank offer rate on US dollar deposits in period t. 
***, **, and * denotes significant level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Coefficient standard errors are in 
parenthesis. 
      Adj. 
R2 
DW Obs. 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
13.171* 
(7.3400) 
0.418 
(.3210) 
-0.004** 
(.0022) 
0.008 
(.0199) 
0.915*** 
(.1420) 
0.79 1.19 18 
Cambodia -48.204*** 
(3.8000) 
2.520*** 
(.1230) 
-0.014** 
(.0064) 
-0.033* 
(.0184) 
0.335 
(.2670) 
0.98 1.86 16 
China -12.358*** 
(1.8400) 
1.417*** 
(.0614) 
0.011*** 
(.0027) 
-0.011 
(.0072) 
0.892*** 
(.0906) 
1.00 1.40 24 
Indonesia 3.312 
(4.4000) 
0.882*** 
(.1250) 
-0.001 
(.0010) 
-0.002 
(.0085) 
0.930*** 
(.0624) 
0.97 0.84 20 
Japan -119.994* 
(67.6000) 
4.521** 
(1.9900) 
0.220 
(.1980) 
0.158* 
(.0848) 
0.069 
(.4660) 
0.10 1.24 25 
Korea -11.881** 
(4.7900) 
1.333*** 
(.1410) 
0.012* 
(.0074) 
-0.006 
(.0122) 
0.827*** 
(.1280) 
0.99 0.95 24 
Lao -28.892*** 
(5.3100) 
1.883*** 
(.1710) 
-0.002 
(.0042) 
-0.019 
(.0242) 
0.455 
(.3980) 
0.94 1.73 19 
Malaysia -14.964*** 
(1.1900) 
1.559*** 
(.0438) 
0.013*** 
(.0022) 
0.009 
(.0072) 
0.441** 
(.2140) 
0.99 1.62 20 
Myanmar -3.519 
(4.7500) 
1.070*** 
(.1580) 
-0.002 
(.0034) 
0.039* 
(.0225) 
0.184 
(.2750) 
0.85 1.68 15 
Philippines -18.335*** 
(5.1000) 
1.600*** 
(.1750) 
-0.001 
(.0051) 
-0.010 
(.0091) 
0.833*** 
(.1130) 
0.98 1.52 20 
Singapore -6.801*** 
(1.8400) 
1.267*** 
(.0706) 
0.014*** 
(.0050) 
-0.016 
(.0119) 
0.626*** 
(.1590) 
0.98 1.54 25 
Thailand -7.041 
(8.7400) 
1.241*** 
(.2980) 
-0.003 
(.0050) 
-0.018* 
(.0104) 
0.840*** 
(.1850) 
0.96 1.43 20 
Vietnam -54.721*** 
(3.6300) 
2.587*** 
(.1050) 
-0.002 
(.0032) 
0.010 
(.0179) 
0.479** 
(.2370) 
0.99 1.55 15 
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The statistical results of Table 2.6C suggest that income plays a significant important role for the 
demand for currency in all ASEAN+3 countries except Brunei Darussalam.  Its coefficients are positive 
but not significant.  Domestic interest rates surprisingly showed positive and significant coefficients for 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore and Thailand.   It is negative and significant only in Japan. Finally, 
international interest rates play a major role in determining the demand for cash balances in Japan, 
Cambodia, Myanmar and Singapore where negative and significant coefficients were found. Using 
currency (C) as money gives weak support for monetary policy impact through channels of income and 
domestic interest rates in the ASEAN region.    
 
Table 2.6C: Regression results for currency (C) for ASEAN+3 
Table shows the statistics for the AR1 regression: (C/P)t  =  α 0  + α 1 Yt + α 2 i
 
t  + α 3  rt  +(C/P)t-1+ ut, where(C/p) = 
logarithm of real total currency (C) in period t, Yt = logarithm of real GDP in period t, it   = real domestic interest rate 
in period t, and rt  = one-year London inter-bank offer rate on US dollar deposits in period t. ***, **, and * denotes 
significant level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Coefficient standard errors are in parenthesis.  
      Adj. R2 DW Obs. 
Brunei Darussalam 15.069***  
(4.0000) 
0.227  
(.1740) 
-0.0004  
(.0014) 
-0.004  
(.0115) 
0.868***  
(.1910) 
0.66 1.30 18 
Cambodia -23.073***  
(3.5300) 
1.656***  
(.1150) 
0.001  
(.0062) 
-0.030*  
(.0177) 
0.263  
(.2770) 
0.97 1.74 16 
China 0.362  
(1.9300) 
0.922***  
(.0638) 
-0.005  
(.0040) 
-0.010  
(.0106) 
0.782***  
(.1370) 
0.99 1.38 24 
Indonesia -4.356  
(2.9000) 
1.034***  
(.0814) 
0.002  
(.0023) 
0.005  
(.0125) 
0.326  
(.2840) 
0.95 1.80 20 
Japan -3.110  
(20.7000) 
1.050*  
(.6140) 
-0.144***  
(.0241) 
-0.021**  
(.0103) 
-0.608*  
(.3250) 
0.41 1.80 9 
Korea 6.474**  
(2.7500) 
0.706***  
(.0798) 
0.003  
(.0099) 
0.008  
(.0149) 
0.503**  
(.2080) 
0.91 2.14 24 
Lao -19.804  
(23.8000) 
1.527**  
(.7720) 
0.001  
(.0049) 
-0.007  
(.0516) 
0.886***  
(.0880) 
0.78 0.77 19 
Malaysia 4.654***  
(1.0300) 
0.721***  
(.0375) 
0.012***  
(.0035) 
0.010  
(.0071) 
-0.079  
(.2210) 
0.95 2.01 20 
Myanmar 15.053***  
(3.9500) 
0.435***  
(.1320) 
0.005**  
(.0023) 
-0.032*  
(.0168) 
0.313  
(.2630) 
0.85 1.49 15 
Philippines 0.021  
(3.0300) 
0.901***  
(.1030) 
-0.007  
(.0094) 
0.004  
(.0121) 
0.144  
(.2500) 
0.88 1.89 20 
Table 2.6C (continued) 
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      Adj. R2 DW Obs. 
Singapore 8.285***  
(1.2700) 
0.583***  
(.0492) 
0.004*  
(.0023) 
-0.015***  
(.0056) 
0.806***  
(.1210) 
0.98 1.72 25 
Thailand -9.169  
(10.2000) 
1.222***  
(.3480) 
0.026***  
(.0058) 
-0.014  
(.0119) 
0.871***  
(.1600) 
0.94 1.27 20 
Vietnam -27.666***  
(4.0600) 
1.751***  
(.1180) 
0.0001  
(.0043) 
-0.005  
(.0216) 
0.346  
(.2660) 
0.97 1.80 15 
 
It is important to fully understand the demand for money when considering the coordination, 
formulation and conduct of monetary policy.  The demand for money has been shown to relate to a 
variety of factors including income and the opportunity cost of holding money.  The opportunity cost of 
holding money in this study is considered to be the domestic interest rate and the international interest 
rate as proxied by LIBOR.  Cointegration techniques have been used to study the money demand 
function.  The technique is used to analyze the long-run equilibrium money demand relationships. It is 
also useful for exploring some short term dynamics like the speed of adjustment to the long run 
equilibrium and the stability of the demand itself.  Tests were used on the narrow and broad definitions 
of money in the ASEAN+3 nations to compare the behavior of the functions. 
It is important to determine the appropriateness of cointegration analysis before employing the 
method. The Weighted Symmetric (WS) test is a unit root test. The test indicates if the variables are 
nonstationary in levels which is necessary for proper use of the Engle-Granger (1987) or Johansen-
Juselius (1990) approach.  Table 2.7 shows the resulting p values for the WS test for unit root. These 
tests indicate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root so cointegration analysis can be 
appropriately applied.  Tests on all variables indicated that the nonstationarity in levels was sufficient to 
employ the cointegration method.  
 
Table 2.7: Unit root test for variables 
This table shows p-values of the Weighted Symmetric (WS) test for unit root. The WS test because has higher 
statistical power compared with the Dickey and Fuller test (see Pantula, Gonzalez-Farias, and Fuller, 1994). Optimal 
lag lengths were chosen using the Akaike Information Criterion and are shown in parenthesis.   
 
 M1/P M2/P C/P Y I r 
Brunei  0.70 (6) 0.88 (6) 0.77 (6) 0.86 (6) 0.36 (3) 0.05 (6) 
Cambodia 0.04 (5) 0.10 (3) 0.12 (5) 0.77 (4) 0.10 (5) 0.80 (5) 
China 0.04 (9) 0.00 (9) 0.71 (9) 0.84 (9) 0.94 (9) 0.97 (9) 
Indonesia 0.89 (7) 0.02 (7) 0.01 (2) 1.00 (7) 0.00 (7) 0.21 (7) 
Japan 0.99 (9) 0.60 (9) 0.97 (1) 0.97 (1) 0.88 (1) 0.00 (1) 
Korea 0.97 (9) 0.95 (4) 0.03 (7) 0.95 (3) 0.46 (3) 0.08 (9) 
Lao 0.92 (6) 0.76 (6) 0.55 (3) 0.81 (2) 0.36 (6) 0.14 (6) 
Malaysia 0.14 (7) 0.94 (7) 0.22 (7) 0.54 (2) 0.26 (2) 0.21 (7) 
Myanmar 1.00 (4) 0.94 (4) 0.35 (4) 0.83 (3) 0.78 (4) 0.75 (2) 
Philippines 0.00 (7) 0.98 (7) 0.19 (7) 0.37 (3) 0.96 (7) 0.21 (7) 
Singapore 0.99 (9) 0.17 (3) 0.82 (3) 0.78 (5) 0.46 (9) 0.97 (9) 
Thailand 0.65 (7) 0.74 (7) 0.18 (2) 0.00 (7) 0.29 (7) 0.21 (7) 
Vietnam 0.89 (2) 0.93 (2) 0.93 (2) 1.00 (4) 0.20 (4) 0.37 (3) 
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The regression results of Table 2.6 A, B, and C were used in estimating the elasticity of the 
demand for (narrow and broad) money with respect to income, domestic interest rates, and 
international interest rates.  The results are given in Tables 2.8 A, B, and C.  Elasticity is estimated by 
regressing the log of real money on the log of real income, domestic interest rate, and international 
rate.   
Tables 2.8 A, B and C confirm that international interest rates are negatively related with 
definitions of money in only a few countries.  Domestic interest rates are more significant factors for 
most countries.  The interest elasticity estimates for both broad and narrow monies are not large for any 
of these countries. The region has countries with both positive and negative relationships however none 
are particularly large enough to suggest that there exists an effective or consistent interest rate channel 
for monetary policy. 
Table 2.8A shows the results of the Engle-Granger Cointegration Test using the narrow 
definition of money.  The table shows the cointegration vectors, p-values and the optimal number of 
lags used for the model.  Japan was included for comparison and had the highest coefficient for the 
relationships between demand for narrow money and foreign and domestic interest rates indicating 
more sensitivity to changes than the other countries.   
 
Table 2.8A: Engle-Granger Cointegration Test for Narrow Money (M1/P) 
This tables shows cointegration vectors, p-values and optimal number of lags used for the model:  
β0 (M1/P)t + β1 Yt + β2 it  + β3  rt  = 0 
 
     p-value # of lags 
Brunei  1.000 0.082 0.010 -0.020 0.91 5 
Cambodia 1.000 -0.403 -0.008 0.002 0.00 5 
China 1.000 -0.869 -0.006 0.030 1.00 9 
Indonesia 1.000 -0.860 -0.002 -0.014 0.81 2 
Japan 1.000 -3.978 -0.088 -0.081 0.99 9 
Korea 1.000 -0.449 0.028 0.001 0.97 5 
Lao 1.000 -6.276 -0.005 0.001 0.84 2 
Malaysia 1.000 -1.556 -0.012 0.010 0.93 2 
Myanmar 1.000 -1.389 0.000 0.007 0.93 3 
Philippines 1.000 -0.067 -0.001 -0.016 0.93 2 
Singapore 1.000 -0.195 0.008 0.009 1.00 9 
Thailand 1.000 -0.513 -0.008 0.017 0.46 2 
Vietnam 1.000 -2.374 0.005 -0.004 0.52 2 
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 For example, the elasticity coefficient of coefficient of real income variables is less than unity for 
many of these countries indicating that narrow money is an inferior good in these countries.  If it is 
greater than unity, narrow money would be considered a luxury good.  A one percent increase in real 
income raises the demand for narrow money by nearly 4 percent in Japan. In the Philippines, the same 
increase in income increases the demand for narrow money by less than one. 
 The size of the elasticity coefficient for either the domestic or foreign interest rates indicates 
that deposit rates are not particularly important.  This would indicate that then demand for real 
balances in most of these economies is strongly dominated by the transactions motive for holding 
money when placed in context with the elasticity coefficient of real income. 
Table 2.8B tested the broad definition of money (M/2). Similar results were obtained.  Most of 
the ASEAN+3 countries do not seem to have very functional interest rate channels that would be 
important to the application of monetary policy.  Given the mix of signs, it is most likely that monetary 
policy would not only be uneven but may have different results. As an example, changes in domestic 
interest rates have by 1 percent in Japan change the demand for broad money about.098 percent. In all 
other countries there will be no perceivable change.   Again, the magnitude of the coefficients for 
income is greater than those of the interest rates indicating that the overwhelming motivation for 
holding money is for transactions.  
 
Table 2.8B: Engle-Granger Cointegration Test for Broad Money (M2/P) 
This tables shows cointegration vectors, p-values and optimal number of lags used for the model:  
β0 (M2/P)t + β1 Yt + β2 it  + β3  rt  = 0 
 
     p-value # of lags 
Brunei  1.000 -0.012 0.008 -0.011 0.97 5 
Cambodía 1.000 -1.313 0.006 0.008 0.60 2 
China 1.000 -0.434 -0.005 0.021 0.97 9 
Indonesia 1.000 -0.356 0.007 -0.004 0.98 3 
Japan 1.000 -5.707 -0.098 -0.079 0.80 9 
Korea 1.000 -0.948 -0.023 0.011 0.65 3 
Lao 1.000 -2.174 0.006 0.031 0.59 2 
Malaysia 1.000 -1.514 -0.014 -0.016 0.96 3 
Myanmar 1.000 -1.553 0.002 -0.038 0.96 3 
Philippines 1.000 0.996 0.000 -0.028 0.64 2 
Singapore 1.000 -0.710 -0.009 -0.005 0.98 7 
Thailand 1.000 -0.575 -0.005 0.007 0.93 2 
Vietnam 1.000 -3.010 0.003 0.002 1.00 4 
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Table 2.8C tested the demand for real currency and its sensitivity to interest rates and GDP.  The sizes of 
coefficients from country to country were inconsistent.  Those associated with interest rates were 
minute.  Currency tests as a luxury good in Lao, Malaysia, and Vietnam.   These inconsistencies  imply 
that a unified monetary policy would have inconsistent results if the policy even managed to transmit 
through the countries at all. 
 
Table A2.8-C: Engle-Granger Cointegration Test for Real Currency (C/P) 
This tables shows cointegration vectors, p-values and optimal number of lags used for the model:  
β0 (C/P)t + β1 Yt + β2 it  + β3  rt  = 0 
  
     p-value # of lags 
Brunei  1.000 0.171 0.001 -0.019 0.81 2 
Cambodia 1.000 -0.484 -0.007 0.006 0.11 5 
China 1.000 0.108 0.011 0.017 1.00 9 
Indonesia 1.000 -0.213 -0.001 -0.011 0.35 2 
Japan 1.000 -1.103 -0.029 0.008 0.86 1 
Korea 1.000 -1.399 -0.003 -0.006 0.36 2 
Lao 1.000 -10.842 -0.008 0.005 0.97 3 
Malaysia 1.000 -1.175 -0.014 -0.005 0.65 3 
Myanmar 1.000 -0.830 -0.005 0.039 0.91 3 
Philippines 1.000 -0.053 0.005 -0.016 0.80 2 
Singapore 1.000 -0.263 0.005 0.007 0.99 9 
Thailand 1.000 -0.431 -0.021 0.014 0.46 2 
Vietnam 1.000 -2.987 0.004 0.013 0.65 2 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
  Recent close coordination between ASEAN finance ministers and central banks should 
produce added benefits of stabilizing banks and bank credit in the region as well applying standardizing 
rules and regulations of financial intermediaries. However, results suggest that the ASEAN region is still 
fairly diverse in terms of depth and breadth of banking institutions and central bank policy. Coordination 
will be essential as recovery from both the financial crisis and the sovereign debt problems around the 
world begins.  This should put upward pressure on export prices which are essential to growth in the 
region. The European Union presents a model where gradual coordination characterized launch of the 
Euro. This cautious example is a good one for ASEAN since it appears to still have some fundamental 
differences in financial depth and their banking systems. It’s reasonable to suggest that four years may 
not be enough time to iron out all differences. 
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The agenda for further coordination becomes apparent given this analysis of the money supply 
multiplier, velocity of money, demand for money, and elasticity of money.   The findings indicate that 
the ratio of currency to the supply of money has generally declined in the ASEAN region suggesting 
substantial growth in the monetized sectors but the high level of variation suggests that significant 
differences still exist.  This result is apparent upon calculation and analysis of conventional estimations 
of the parameters of monetary policy.   
Findings suggest that residents in Vietnam and Cambodia may have a higher preference for 
currency versus demand deposits when compared to residents in other ASEAN countries.  These two 
member states have a lower degree of monetization and poor access to the banking sector when 
compared to the other members still committed to integration.  Political commitment to modernization 
may incur cross country fiscal support to these countries.  Myanmar is another country that has 
significant issues with financial market development.  All countries have fairly undeveloped bond 
markets. 
The substantial differences that were found in the money multipliers of ASEAN members may 
suggest that application of a unified monetary policy for all members may present difficulties.  Again, 
cross country fiscal support may be required to bring weaker members’ performance in line in several 
key areas prior to complete unification.   Nearly all of these countries have vast infrastructure shortfalls 
so that it may be difficult to make the political case for helping out neighbors. 
There are many other factors that necessitate caution. The coefficients of variation differ 
substantially between members for velocity.  These differences reflect differences in the relative growth 
of currency, demand deposits, and quasi-money.  The statistical results suggest that monetary 
authorities in the GCC integration should not base their policy decisions on a simple hypothesis such as 
the constant velocity of money since velocity is not consistent across the region.  It would also be 
difficult to implement a Taylor rule. 
Findings indicate that real income exerts a significant influence on the demand for real cash 
balances in the region.  In addition, narrow demand for money is not sensitive to variations in domestic 
or international interest rates for all members.   International interest rates significantly influence the 
demand for narrow money a few of these countries.    A layered plan for unification may provide more 
pragmatic. 
The decision to form a monetary union should not be based solely on issues surrounding 
monetary policy since fiscal policy is also an important element to success.  However, strong 
consideration should be given to efficaciousness of regional monetary policy when contemplating 
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unification because monetary policy is delegated to a central bank.  As a result, each individual member 
may have varying concerns and needs that will be subjugated to the needs of the union and the region.   
Some of the member states of ASEAN community have relatively weak banking systems and only four 
years to comply with the financial blueprint. Additionally, economic development in the region means 
that increased public infrastructure may be necessary and that requires additional funding from both 
domestic and foreign sources. Many countries still have undeveloped bond markets.  Funding can be 
achieved from many sources but is always supported by investor faith in a functional credit market 
monitored by a central bank that recognizes the need for prudent monetary policy strategies.  
Homogenous policies, similar regulations, and enhanced financial integration can only help the process 
of monetary unification.  While ASEAN has been a successful trading bloc and has meets many of the 
unification criteria proffered by theory, there are structural and systemic issues in members’ monetary 
variables which warrant caution while proceeding forward.   
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ASEAN and the FDI of Channel Trade 
 
Introduction 
 
 Many regions of the world would like to replicate the economic and financial market integration 
achieved by the European Union (EU) and other regions.  Successful currency unions exist in many parts 
of the developing world already.  Examples include the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union of OECS 
(established in 1965), the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (established in 1945), 
and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (also established in 1945).  There are about 15 
proposed unions at this writing.   Additionally, there are countries that belong to Currency Boards that 
share currencies but do not necessarily move to full economic integration.  There are also countries that 
‘dollarize’ or adopt the currencies of larger, influential economies.  
Countries seeking full integration will eventually share a common currency and central bank.  They 
commit to joint ways to increase the welfare and economic efficiency of members. The formation of the 
relationship is based on the idea of finding an optimum currency area (OCA).  The most basic definition 
of an OCA is given in Mundell (1961).  It is simply defined as “an area within which exchange rates are 
fixed.”5   A current working definition might be that of a geographical area that maximizes economic 
efficiency by sharing a single currency, fully abolishing trade barriers and tariffs, and eventually 
establishing one central bank to handle a unified and credible monetary policy.  
Steps to complete integration are gradual and begin by forming a preferential trading area. Once 
established, members typically set up a free trade zone followed by a customs union.  Countries move to 
adopt institutional changes that remove differences in laws, financial institutions, and trade 
arrangements during these middle phases.  ASEAN presented and passed a blueprint for this as the 
Chiang Mai Initiative during 2000-2001 that has been updated as recently as 2010. Goals include 
removing internal barriers-to-free trade, liberalization of financial markets, standardization of financial 
markets, regulations, and institutions, and increased factor mobility.  Partner countries also attempt to 
move their economic performance closer together to achieve similar rates of inflation, GDP growth, and 
levels of per capita GDP. Convergence in economic variables eliminates the impact of price equilibrium 
shock once unification occurs and a common currency is established. Countries can move towards full 
                                                          
5
 Mundell, Robert A. (1961); “A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas”, The American Economic Review, vol. 51, no.4, 
(September, 1961), pp. 657-665 
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economic and monetary union and integration once a single market is established.  Political will and 
coordination become essential at this point. 
There are a number of nations that dollarize to achieve some of the benefits of the OCA.   
Dollarization basically means that a smaller country adopts the currency of a much larger neighbor and 
relies on the stability of the neighbor and its central bank to achieve effective financial markets and 
trade arrangements.  For example, Bhutan and Nepal use the Indian rupee.  Lesotho, Namibia, and 
Swaziland use the South African rand.  Currency Unions are formal arrangements.  Dollarization 
arrangements can be formal, informal, or de facto.  Much planning and negotiation goes into complete 
economic integration.  It can take years to achieve the coordination and cooperation necessary for 
success.  It is a process and a commitment. 
Many long standing, modern currency unions and boards resulted as colonial rule collapsed around 
the world.  Currency unions frequently form within a geographically contiguous region between 
neighbors that share colonial heritage or some cultural features. The demise of the Bretton Woods 
System in the 1970s―with the resultant exchange rate havoc―also played an important role in the 
formation of OCAs.   Many developing nations are looking at the experience of the EU to aid their 
development efforts. 
Optimal Currency Area theory provides a framework that lets researchers study the potential costs 
and benefits of complete monetary and financial integration. It also provides insight into regional and 
country characteristics that smooth the transition or make transition difficult.  Countries should be fully 
aware of all these factors when entering a proposed union.   The benefits of the proposal should 
outweigh its costs.   There are other regime choices available to a country including freely floating 
exchange rates, fully independent and controllable monetary policy, and open capital flows.  This 
arrangement has been chosen by the U.S.A., the U.K., Japan and many larger or more developed 
nations.  One primary benefit of this choice is that a political state retains its sovereignty.  Coordination 
between sovereign nations with sovereign debt issues has become an issue challenging the stability of 
the modern EU.  Sovereign debt differences within country members and its impact on the union is a 
popular research topic today for those studying integration’s costs and benefits.6   
 It should be clear to a country’s policy makers that the benefits of currency union for their country 
are superior to other regime choices.  There are multiple choices and there is no agreement in the 
research community on one best choice that fits all.  That is why it is imperative that research on each 
                                                          
6
 See De Grauwe, Paul, “The Governance of a Fragile Eurozone”, University of Leuven and CEPS, working paper, 
April, 2011. 
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union should encompass the many facets that influence success or failure along with attempts to assess 
the chance for success using the region’s data.  In this case, the EU serves as an important benchmark.  
Recent research even indicates that there are different costs and benefits for industrialized nations than 
those nations that are still developing so there is no cookie cutter approach or standard recipe for 
successful integration. 
However, there are known benefits.  Countries adopting a single currency within a region are 
generally thought to experience greater economic integration, lower transaction costs, and higher levels 
of both trade and investment.  Unification eliminates issues of exchange rate instability. This is 
especially true for regions with limited hedging and risk management opportunities and shallow 
financial markets.  A shared single currency, central bank, and monetary policy are usually the 
penultimate goal of financial integration.   Financial integration can lead to increased development and 
credibility in nations with a history of inflation, poor financial institutions, and bad monetary policy.  It 
has been shown to be a means of beneficial institutional change and can alleviate political pressure on 
monetary policy.  It is these changes that can improve trade and investment opportunities in a country 
or region. 
Mongelli (2002) provides a classification scheme for the primary benefits and costs of participating 
in an OCA.  His paper examines research in the area and looks for prevailing themes.  Mongelli considers 
the first set of benefits to be improvements in ‘microeconomic efficiency’.  This is attributed to the 
shared currency’s ability to better function as money.  There also exist benefits that reduce transaction 
costs and riskiness because of increased circulation of the single currency.  The widespread adoption of 
a single currency in diverse markets heightens price transparency and deepens financial market 
offerings.  
Monetary unification is thought to foster more competitive markets and increase the size and 
diversity of an economy.  Mongelli reviews many studies to find increased macroeconomic stability as 
well as economic growth in countries that form an OCA.  Again, price stability and a large populace of 
adopters will eventually lead to more sophisticated financial markets and increased ability to react and 
weather exogenous shocks.   This means that small countries can access financial innovations and 
markets more quickly than they could alone and businesses and investors have access to multiple ways 
to best manage risk. 
Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010) summarize research on the macroeconomic costs and benefits of 
monetary union.  One of the major concerns of a sovereign nation is the loss of independent monetary 
policy.  However, research shows that unification tends to remove ways for political interests to use 
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competitive currency devaluation as well as eliminates some instance of harmful monetary policy 
spillovers.  Small and developing nations can more rapidly develop by accessing a nonpolitical and 
credible central bank. 
Then, there is the ‘Rose effect’.   Rose (2000) began a line of study showing the relationship between 
currency union membership and international trade.  This study concluded that members of a currency 
union were three times more likely to trade than similar countries using their own unique currencies.  
The results of this study set off a thread of research that eventually concluded that there is a large 
positive effect but probably not as large as Rose (2000) found.  
Rose (2004) found that currency union membership generally “increases bilateral trade between 
30% and 90%” by employing a meta-study. The results have been so consistent that it is now called the 
‘Rose Effect’ and is an accepted benefit of currency union membership.   While the Rose work and other 
research has established validity of the result, many felt that work was needed to determine the source 
of the result (Anderson & Van Wincoop, 2004) as well as the validity of the size estimates.   Finance 
ministers and other country level policy creators were also interested in finding the specific channels of 
transmission for the Rose Effect to employ better structures and laws to take full advantage of the 
increased trade opportunities. 
Early criticisms of Rose’s work and the scope of his findings were based on measurement problems 
due to use of the naïve gravity model.   Disparagement of Rose (2000)—with its highly controversial 
results—can be found in Nitsch (2002 and 2007). The issues have been addressed in ongoing research 
into the area. This criticism usually focuses on omitted variables, model misspecification, possibility of 
reverse causality, and complexities within the sample due to specific country characteristics. As a result 
of the criticism and further research, the naïve gravity model has been modified to address estimation 
issues typical when using this type of data.  Efforts to refine the model continue.   
Baldwin (2006) surveys the empirical literature on the EMU and international trade volumes.  He 
discovered that recent research has identified three channels as the sources of the trade boosting 
effects of currency unions.  The first is the relative price channel.  When a single currency is introduced 
into a region, it lowers the relative price of traded goods coming from within the OCA. There are two 
sources of this impact.  First, there is a reduction in bilateral trade costs associated with exchange rate 
risk or transaction costs.  Then, there is the impact from increased competition within the OCA putting 
downward pressure on prices.  The second channel comes from an increase in newly traded goods 
(Baldwin & Taglioni, 2004).  In some regions, firms export a wider range of their products within the 
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community than they did before because of the reduced transactions costs.  The third channel is Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI).  The FDI channel is the least investigated channel to date. 
The FDI channel is an important area of research for several reasons.  First, FDI is an essential part of 
a firm’s international strategy which is important form a corporate finance standpoint.  Second, FDI has 
a knowledge spill-over component.  Firms can bring valuable foreign know-how when they bring capital 
or invest in a country.  Attracting FDI is an important development strategy for an underdeveloped 
nation because it not only brings new jobs and funds; it brings new technologies, products, and 
methods. 
Most research-to-date on the three channels has focused on the EU because the data is more 
available and considered more reliable.  Data quality has been a big issue when dealing with FDI so it is 
also easier to study the other channels.  There are now ten years of empirical data for the EU but there 
is still an obstacle to precise empirical measurements.  EU integration studies are primarily post ante.  
Integration is a long process.  Policy makers should be able to see benefit while in process to encourage 
liberalization and modernization of institutions and systems. Documentable benefits strengthen political 
will for cooperation and changes to law, institutions, and regulatory environment. 
Since the EU was the first major union, other proposed regions have developed plans on their 
experience and have hope to achieve earlier and stronger results by learning and following the lessons.  
The post ante focus on the EU allows for consideration of theoretical underpinnings for existing unions.  
The EU data provides important estimates and insight into the benefits of the Rose Effect for developed 
nations and current unions.   If the EU results are consistent with countries that have dollarized, 
integrated, or use currency boards, then, increasing improvement in FDI and trade should be noticeable 
in those countries moving towards unification as participants in market anticipate increasing benefit.  
Models used to study post EU data should be applicable to proposed regions and should demonstrate 
ongoing improvements in other nations that have unified or progress to unification as long as reliable 
data is available.  This should help quantify and extend understanding of the Rose Effect. These are the 
major hypothesis, goal and motivation of this essay.   
This study uses data from ASEAN+3 countries for two modified gravity models.  The majority of 
these countries are now providing data to the IMF, the World Bank, and the Asian Development bank so 
data is becoming more plentiful and reliable in the region.  These refined gravity models are used to 
study improvements in trade and FDI in the ASEAN region as it moves closer to unification.  A variable 
will be used to control for positive steps (e.g. announced agreements) made by the community as it 
relates to steps towards unification.  Positive moves towards unification should increase FDI and trade 
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activity to some degree, just as actual unification leads increased FDI and trade.  Countries behind in the 
unification process—which is likely for some of the ASEAN countries—should experience significantly 
less FDI and trade than their neighbors who progress to unification.   Trading zones with more advanced 
progress in the unification effort should attract significantly more FDI as world investors move to the 
region in search of their share of the “Rose Effect”. 
As previously stated, this study uses two forms of a refined gravity model to capture trade and FDI 
effects. The gravity model has been used in recent empirical studies to estimate the Euro’s FDI effects.  
A general specification of the model (Baldwin & Desantis, 2008) is expressed thusly. 
 
                                                    
(3.1) 
FDIod,t is the FDI flow from an originating nation (o) to a destination nation (d) in the year (t) as 
measured by capital account data. The D variables are dummies are fixed effect variables for originating 
and destination countries.  The X vector can include other variables that may affect FDI flows.  There are 
a set of a variables typical gravity model used to evaluate trade flows in the vector.  These include GDP 
per capita, transaction costs as proxied by geographical distance between financial centers, the 
presence of adjacent borders, and various measures of financial depth or openness, exchange rate 
volatility or degree of liberalization or corruption within governments.    
This study introduces an additional dummy variable into a gravity model in the spirit of Bénassy-
Quéré et al (2000) that estimates FDI and controls for the impact of price competiveness and exchange 
rate volatility.    The same dummy variable will be used for a gravity model introduced de Sousa and 
Lochard (2004) that estimates trade using FDI as a control variable among others.  The first estimates 
FDI directly. The second explores linkages between FDI and trade. The de Souse and Lochard model 
controls for EU membership.  In the spirit of that model, the dummy variable in this model will identify 
progress in the ASEAN agreements via the dummy variable News and control for ASEAN membership 
instead. 
Refinements to the gravity model have removed some of the earliest criticisms of measurements of 
the Rose effect in the Eurozone.  It is possible to take these improvements to achieve better estimates 
of the Rose effect in other OCAs.   This makes this analysis unique in that it studies countries moving 
towards unification rather than those that have already achieved unification.  
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Literature Review 
 
Increased worldwide FDI has been one of the most significant consequences of globalization. There 
is growing interest in the both theory and empirical research dealing with this phenomenon.  As 
previously stated, the gravity model is the most popular way to capture deviations from predicted trade 
volume due to policies or other frictions in markets (Eichengreen & Irwin, 1998).   The gravity model of 
international trade was developed by two researchers working independently of each other in the early 
1960s (Tinbergen, 1962 and Pӧyhonen, 1963).  The original model was augmented by Linnemann (1966).  
The gravity model in its most basic form shows how trade between countries is impacted by their size as 
measured by national income and the cost of transportation between countries as measured by the 
distance between major economic centers.  Linnemann expanded the variable list by adding population 
as a measure of country size.  It is also normal to use per capita income to augment the model as a 
control for development issues.  
The augmented model captures the impact of policy on baseline trade through the use of various 
dummy variables.  The Rose Effect shows that membership in a currency union is one significant policy 
variable that encourages increased trade.  If there are greater benefits to actual economic and monetary 
integration as a national and regional policy then it follows those participant countries demonstrating 
momentum towards unification by actively following unification strategies should see increased FDI 
inflows. FDI should flow to the region in anticipation of the trade boom.  One of the possible reasons 
this should occur is because steps towards unification--including increased factor and capital mobility 
accompanied by a free trade zone in the region--should be accompanied by increasing exchange rate 
stability which reduces the risk and costs of trade. Trade also increases linkages and promotes 
knowledge spill overs.  Increased linkages leads and factor mobility move markets closer together so 
that underlying variables in the countries’ economies become similar.  Exchange rate risk is reduced and 
eventually eliminated within the OCA.  Prices within the community should equilibrate during the 
process.  Volatility should be reduced and convergence in fundamental macroeconomic variables should 
be indicated.   
Currency unification eliminates exchange rate transactions cost within the OCA and provides a 
wider-used currency for which increased hedging opportunities should develop as the community 
adopts sharing of common trading platforms.  A shared currency-based bond market also develops.  
Monetary integration especially encourages trade between members (Micco et al. 2003).  Financial 
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market integration removes barriers to efficient cross-border allocation of capital thereby reducing the 
risk in investment decisions. 
Researchers are starting to examine the effect of currency union and monetary integration on the 
FDI channel of international trade.  Wei and Choi (2002) and de Sousa and Lochard (2004) found a 
positive relationship between monetary integration and FDI.  Much of the early research was 
accomplished using countries that presently have complete dollarization or have joined a currency 
board.  Many recent studies focus on data for the EU or more developed economies like Hong Kong 
(Baldwin et al, 2008).   Recent research focusing on the Eurozone shows strong evidence that common 
euro usage has boosted bilateral FDI flows (Taylor, 2008 and Buch & Lipponer, 2007).     
As previously noted, the research typically employs some form of refined gravity model.   Bénassy-
Quéré et al (2000) offer a modified gravity model demonstrating how exchange rate volatility matters to 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and conclude that exchange rate regime choice is important to trade 
and FDI.  Building on the idea that FDI is strongly influenced by geography, their work suggested that 
“frontiers of monetary areas” can be designed to influence the flow of FDI.    Empirical data for their 
tests consisted of a panel of 42 developing countries receiving FDI from 17 investing countries.   The 
panel of data was not concentrated on any particular region but did identify countries as emerging or 
developed. The model controls for the presence of oil in the target country as well as any price 
competitiveness that may exist. This model uses trade as the variable of interest and examines FDI as a 
channel of the Rose Effect.  The first model in this study will employ this approach. 
De Sousa & Lochard (2004) examine trade as the variable of interest.  Their gravity model estimates 
both the impact of monetary union and FDI on trade.  Their results—using recent EMU data—find that 
about half of the EMU effect on trade is indirect.  This means that the trade comes from an increase in 
FDI.  They use sensitivity analysis to test their results for robustness.  Their results demonstrate the Rose 
Effect but do not determine the reasons for the increase in both intra-EMU trade and trade with 
countries outside of the EMU.   Tests for sensitivity included controls for adjacency, language, GDP 
growth and geographical distance. The second model of this study will use this approach. 
As with later research, de Sousa & Lochard deal with the endogeneity issue. This is the problem that 
the FDI variable may be an endogenous regressor meaning any OLS estimator may be inconsistent.  
Cheng and Wall (2005) discuss methods for controlling heterogeneity in Gravity Models.  There have 
been advances in econometrics that have made the gravity model less problematic. 
Ross (2007) uses the new open economy macro perspective—with exchange rate movements—to 
study FDI.   The model is driven by volatility in nominal interest rates that impact exchange rate 
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volatility.  The estimates then measure the impact on merger and analysis activity.  Her results suggest 
that common euro usage increases merger and analysis activity. 
Couerdacier, DeSantis, & Aviat (2008) explain determinants of cross border merger and acquisition 
(M&A) activity using sector data. This study uses data from the period of 1985-2004. The panel includes 
21 developed countries for the originating FDI in 31 host countries. Within the host country panel, 20 
are developed nations.  The other 11 come from developing nations. Their sector data focuses on both 
manufacturing and service data from 10 areas apiece.  The study includes around 10,000 observations 
so the data base is huge.   Couerdacier et al try to isolate and measure M&A activity resulting from 
European integration.  They use Poisson Maximum Likelihood estimators to overcome the problem of 
biased estimators in standard OLS. They found there has even been a higher degree of intra-activity 
within the EU and among the other nations that belong to the trade zone but not the monetary 
unification effort.  The results were significantly larger for those countries that joined the monetary 
union. 
These studies also support the conclusion that the EU and Euro area membership have a direct and 
positive effect on FDI and trade.   Major trends identified in Baldwin et al (2008) were that impacts were 
stronger felt in manufacturing sectors than service sectors.  Impact was larger within sectors than across 
sectors. Cross-border merger and analysis activity generally was achieved by “restructuring capital 
within the same sector of activity, rather than boosting the formation of conglomerate activities 
between sectors.”  Additionally, relevant studies found that inbound FDI from countries outside the also 
EU increased; although that was about half as significant as the activity within the zone.  Mathematical 
estimates of the impacts were varied. 
This study looks for indications of similar enhanced FDI and trade improvements in the ASEAN zone.   
Ongoing improvements in gravity model will be used to capture these results by using estimators that 
have been shown to be more efficient for the EU studies. The study employs models successfully used to 
assess the impact of EU integration on ASEAN +3 data in an attempt to extend the usefulness of models 
and reinforce general theoretical conclusions from EU research. 
 
Data and Methodology 
 
There are several different approaches to define and measure FDI.  Choice of approach depends on 
the focus of the study.  There are two main empirical ways to study FDI that determine choice of 
preferred definition and measurement.  One line of research uses data that primarily studies outbound 
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and inbound FDI to measure horizontal and vertical movements at the micro level.  This research 
examines the underlying motivation for FDI.  Some FDI is based on ‘outsourcing’ in that a corporation 
looks for a substitute for a step in production then re-imports product back to the home country or 
elsewhere. The other type is FDI with a goal to establishing a foothold in another country that will also 
serve as the final market for the goods or services.  FDI in this sense is motivated by either lowering 
costs in the first case or expanding markets in the second.  Overall direction of trade is not as important 
as the motivator. 
 Using capital flows data from balance of payments sources is more relevant when researchers are 
less concerned about the specific motivation and more interested in the movement in and out of 
specific countries.   Motivation still underlies the data but is not of interest. This study looks at FDI as 
part of the capital account of balance of payments because the goal is to capture the momentum of FDI 
flows coming to a country with certain characteristics.  Current, refined gravity models try capture firms’ 
location decisions based on preference to defined characteristics present in a country rather than their 
overall motivation for relocation.  The theoretical roots of these studies are found in new trade theory 
dealing with international location choice of Multinational Entities (MNE) advanced in Markusen (1994).     
FDI is complex and can manifest in many forms and for as many reasons at the micro level.  
However, the results of combined decisions aggregate in a country’s capital account.  FDI is beneficial 
for a developing country which is why countries need strategies to encourage FDI inflows.  Technological 
and knowledge spill overs increase factor productivity (Borenzstein and de Gregorio, 1995).  FDI is a 
stable source of financing and considered superior to portfolio investment (Lipsey, 1999).  FDI also 
provides more long term financing (Stiglitz, 1999) which enables long term investment commitments. 
There are benefits and complications when using the definition associated with capital account data.  
It is frequently used because the numbers are easier to find.  However, it is ultimately considered a 
proxy because it is indirectly related to real economic activity.   The high level numbers capture all 
manners of FDI activity from establishing subsidiaries, buying affiliates, or starting from scratch with 
Greenfield operations.  FDI activity also includes equity capital, reinvested earnings and loans.  There are 
a variety of implied frictions that infiltrate data because of the variety of investment types captured by 
this definition.      
Equations of interest in this study are estimated using annual data for the ASEAN+3 countries for the 
time period of 1992 to 2010. This includes data resulting from two major exogenous shocks.  The first is 
the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998.  The second macroshock is the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-
2008.  Sources for data include the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
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the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade IFS 
Databases.  Distance data comes from CEPII.  
 
Models 
 
This study uses two refined gravity models.  Model One gives a direct primary estimation of FDI.   In 
contrast, Model Two provides a direct primary estimation of trade with FDI as one control variable 
among others.  The basic goal of the research is to check for the implications of movement towards the 
proposed the ASEAN currency union on levels of FDI and trade.  Monetary integration includes several 
phases that may ultimately progress to complete monetary unification.  Typically, countries with some 
kind of mutual economic, political, or cultural interest meet to determine the feasibility of coordinating 
exchange rates, factor movement, and capital markets. This began in earnest for the ASEAN+3 countries 
in 1997 as a direct result of the Asian Currency crisis.  China, South Korea and Japan are part of the Free 
Trade Area but are unlikely to become part of any monetary union formed by ASEAN itself.  The ASEAN 
countries continue to assess their current situation and adopt plans to move their economies and 
financial markets closer together over time.   The intermediate stages taken—prior to any country 
subset commitment to monetary unification—should measurably enhance trade and investment 
performance for the participating countries.   
Quick transition is not possible for many reasons that are political, institutional, and theoretical in 
nature.   As an example, easing transition to union is essential so that acute exchange rate adjustments 
do not disrupt the economies of participating countries.  Intermediate steps like liberalization of capital 
accounts, establishment of Free Trade Agreements, and increased economic and financial openness 
have occurred.   Continued policy advances may depend on noticeable, measured improvements.   
These steps are captured in country indexes and dummy variables in refined gravity models.  Also of 
interest is when members join ASEAN as well as when they formed the Free Trade area. 
The models also include a news component dummy that indicates an event in the ASEAN and 
ASEAN+3 community announcing or showing formal progress towards unification for the community 
and its members.  This variable and the others aim to capture increased FDI and trade motivated by 
those seeking the known benefits from factors related to unification generally known as the Rose Effect 
as the ASEAN community moves to unification.    
The first model controls for the impact of exchange rate stability and price competitiveness on FDI in 
addition to the news component dummy and other control variables.  This refined gravity model form 
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was developed using a theoretical model developed by Bénassy-Quéré et al (2000)designed to study the 
choice of exchange rate regime by controlling for determinants of location choices of multinational 
entities.  The authors used the model to show that exchange rate volatility has a negative impact on FDI 
and to argue that countries might be able to attract FDI inflows by forming currency unions to eliminate 
or alleviate exchange rate volatility.7 
The augmented equation estimated in this study from the Bénassy-Quéré formulation is: 
 
                                                                   
                                     
(3.2) 
In keeping with the rationale that the capital account is the best place to capture a country’s ability to 
attract FDI inflows, the variable (FDIi,t) for each period is defined as: 
 
          [
                       
         
] 
 (3.3) 
where FDI stock is empirically represented by Total Foreign Direct Investment. 
  FDI is capital moving from one country to another so it basically represents an investment decision 
like any other.  The volatility of return as well as the level of return impacts the decision.  The 
competitiveness and volatility variables capture the impact of changes in the real exchange rate effects 
on FDI.  The price competitive variables control for appreciation and depreciation through changes in 
real exchange rates.   A depreciation of the home currency tends to induce more FDI inflows in general 
terms (Goldberg & Kelin, 1997).  The reverse happens for an appreciation of the real exchange rate 
(Barrel & Pain, 1998, Udomkerdmongkol et al, 2008).  
This model specification controls for the trade-off between price competitiveness and nominal 
exchange rate stability in the FDI decision to allow for a cleaner estimate of the how much of the FDI 
choice is due to announced progress towards the union and other variables.  The competiveness 
variables Cj,k and       Cj,k capture the price competitiveness.   Variable Cj,k  is competitiveness of country 
i. It is calculated as the real exchange the rate between country i (hos country) and country k (investor 
country).  The rate is in direct quotation or units of the local currency of country required to buy one 
                                                          
7
 Bénassy-Quéré, Agnès, Lionel Fontagené and Amina Lahrèche-Révil, “Exchange rate strategies in the competition 
for attracting FDI”, January 2000, presented at ADBI/CEPII/KIEP Conference on Exchange Rate Regimes in Emerging 
Market Economies, Tokyo, December, 1999 
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unit of foreign currency. Model results should show a direct relationship between FDI inflows and 
competitiveness of country i which indicates that a depreciation of the currency from i against country k 
increases FDI inflows. 
  Variable       Cj,k is the competitiveness of region j that are countries considered alternative 
location to country i. It is calculated as the real exchange rate between countries j and country k. This 
rate is also in direct quotation or units of local currency to buy one unit of foreign currency.  It is the real 
exchange rate where each country in the region’s exchange rate is weighted by the GDP of this country 
and the total GDP of the region.  Country i should attract more FDI inflows when its currency depreciates 
against possible alternative locations. 
The impact of the volatility of exchange rates is accounted for with variable Voli,k.  It is 
empirically represented by the difference in the log of the nominal bilateral exchange rate. The rate is in 
direct quotation or the number of units of local currency to buy one unit of foreign currency.  FDI should 
be negatively impacted by volatility since this should indicate more risk and the need for higher return.  
High nominal exchange rate volatility should decrease FDI inflows. 
 The impact of differences in transportations costs is proxied by the geographic distance in miles 
between financial capitals of country i (host country) and country k (investor country) represented here 
as Di,k,t. This is the traditional proxy for such costs in these kinds of models.   FDI should be negatively 
related to costs because large distances should represent higher transactional costs and potentially 
lower rates of return. The variable Open is empirically calculated as the ratio of total exports and 
imports between i and k divided by GDP of I This is a variable introduced in the Bénassy-Quéré et al 
study to control for “the nature of foreign direct investment”.  The proxy was designed so that a large 
openness ratio would indicate FDI with a goal of re-exportation and would elucidate some underlying 
motives for FDI in that country.  FDI should be positively related to Open. 
The dummy variable News is given a value when a meeting of ASEAN members produces a formal 
agreement or signed strategy that shows progress towards unification.  Examples include years the 
November 2007 charter signing, the 2001 Chiang Mai Imitative or the 2004 Framework Agreement or 
Integration of Priority Sectors.  Since the News variable specifies positive steps, it should be positively 
related to FDI and would be significant if any of the news encourages FDI.  The dummy FTA represents 
the presence of a signed multilateral or bilateral Free Trade Agreement with a country other than ASEAN 
membership. This research adds a control for Free Trade Agreement.  Given these countries established 
free trade agreements during the period. Free Trade Agreements and the establishment of Free Trade 
Zones is one important step towards unification.  ASEAN membership is assigned its own dummy 
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variable.  Cambodia—as an example—joined ASEAN during the period under investigation.  This should 
control for any preferences for other ASEAN members or special arrangements.  Models One’s estimates 
were calculated using country and year fixed effect estimation with robust heteroscedasticity errors 
applied. 
The second gravity model is based on one developed in de Sousa & Lochard (2004)8. This gravity 
model directly estimates trade and uses FDI as a control variable.  It is a more typical gravity model used 
to examine trade. The augmented version used in this study controls for the existence of a Free Trade 
Agreements and uses the News variable to see if announced progress towards unification effects trade. 
 
                       (        )                         
                                                
(3.4) 
The variable Trade captures bilateral trade between countries i and k in USD at time t. Y is GDP of 
the country. The variable log(Yi,tYk,t) is a conventional proxy that controls for size of a country’s economy. 
The other variables for distance, exchange rate volatility, positive news, and ASEAN membership, 
presence of a FTA and the log of FDI are the same as those defined for Model One. Models Two 
estimates were calculated using country, partner and year fixed effect estimation.  The authors of the 
original model expressed concerns about a potential simultaneity issue that could lead to an 
inconsistent OLS estimator since trade and FDI are related but the direction of causality is unknown. This 
estimation technique handles those concerns.   If traditional gravity model estimations hold true, size 
should be positively related to Trade.  Distance and Volatility should be negatively related to trade. 
News, ASEAN and FTA are predicted to be directly related to trade. 
 
Results 
  
 The results of the econometric estimation for Model 1 are shown in Table 3.1.  Estimations were 
run for the ASEAN countries as a group and the ASEAN+3 countries.  The ASEAN model uses data of the 
ASEAN community members while ASEAN+3 results include the region’s three economic powerhouses 
of China, South Korea, and Japan. 
  The estimation for ASEAN+3 is given 
                                                          
8
 de Sousa, José and Julie Lochard, (2004) ‘The currency union effect on trade and the FDI channel’, working paper, 
University of Rennes and University of Paris 
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(3.5) 
 All variables were significant at the 10% level with the exception of the news variable for this 
ASEAN+3 countries estimation stated above. The coefficient for Ci,k,t representing price competitiveness 
of country i is positive as expected. This estimation infers that a 1% appreciation in the real exchange 
rate reduces the FDI stock by 39%. Depreciation in the home country currency induces higher foreign 
direct investment inflows. The coefficient for volatility is negative indicating that an increase in nominal 
exchange volatility reduces FDI inflows.  This reinforces the Bénassy-Quéré et al result.   The coefficient 
value is large indicating that a 1% increase in exchange rate increased FDI inflows by over 1000 percent. 
The coefficient for ρi,k,tCj,k,t is positive which is a somewhat unexpected sign.  A positive relationships 
here implies that when the exchange rate of country I and its location competitors in group j 
depreciated against other countries, the result is higher FDI for both, country i and alternative location 
or competitors j.  
 Table 3.1:  Estimation of Gravity Equation for Model One stated as: 
                                                                   
                                     
 ASEAN+3 ASEAN 
Constant 5.607***  
(12.323) 
6.559***  
(14.365) 
          0.392***  
(5.381) 
0.689***  
(11.969) 
         -11.067***  
(-8.156) 
-11.033***  
(-7.996) 
                0.976***  
(8.265) 
0.384***  
(4.117) 
          0.4852***  
(8.555) 
0.213***  
(3.661) 
Open 5.588***  
(9.856) 
6.563***  
(13.304) 
News -0.153  
(-0.734) 
-0.320*  
(-1.739) 
ASEAN -1.385***  
(-16.041) 
0.929***  
(9.673) 
FTA -0.693***  
(-5.004) 
-0.719***  
(-4.681) 
Adj R2 0.26 0.33 
# Obs 2565 1929 
*significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, ***significant at 10% level, 
 White robust standard errors are in parentheses 
Country and year dummies not reported 
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(Table 3.1 continued) 
Variables Definitions 
FDIi: Total Foreign Direct Investment in country i divided by World CPI  
 
Voli,k: Volatility The difference in the log of the nominal bilateral exchange; the nominal exchange rate is 
in direct quotation or units of local currency j to buy one unit of foreign currency k 
 
Ci,k: Competitiveness of country i as given by the real exchange rate between country i and country k, the 
rate is in direct quotation or units of local currency to buy one unit of foreign currency 
 
      Cj,k: Competitiveness of country j as given by the real exchange rate between alternative countries j 
and country k during period ρ. (The rate is in direct quotation: units of local currency to buy one unit of 
foreign currency.  It is the real exchange rate, where each alternate location country’s exchange rate is 
weighted by the GDP in this country and the total GDP of the alternate location countries. ) 
 
Open: Ratio of total export and import between i and k divided by GDP of i 
 
News: a dummy of positive news for the ASEAN countries 
 
ASEAN: a dummy indicating both country and partner belongs to ASEAN at time t 
 
Di,k: Distance in miles between capital of country i and country k 
 
 The coefficient sign for Distance (Di,k,t) that proxies for transportation cost is positive.   This is 
possible even though the sign differs from the results of the Bénassy-Quéré study. Their study covered a 
much larger geographical region where transportation costs could be quite varied. However, it is 
reasonable to think that the higher transportation cost implied by the higher the distance means the 
investor may be more likely to invest in the economy rather than export towards that economy.  
Distance in this sample has a more strategic role than the Bénassy-Quéré results. This may be due this 
studies sample which includes countries that are not necessarily contiguous and are somewhat spread 
out but are basically in the same region.  
 The coefficient for the variable Open is positive and large indicating that the FDI may be partially 
aimed towards re-exporting.  This is as expected and not surprising given the large number of firms that 
move to the ASEAN nations in outsourcing strategies. The News variable did not test significant for the 
ASEAN+3 countries.  It did test significant at the 1% level for the ASEAN group.  The News variable had a 
negative sign in this model indicating FDI was less likely as announced progress in unification took place.  
ASEAN membership had a negative coefficient as did FTA for the ASEAN+3 countries. The ASEAN 
coefficient sign was positive for the ASEAN sample only.   This possibly indicates the increased 
relationship between the ASEAN nations increases the level of cooperation between the nations and 
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induces a sense of shared community.  ASEAN membership is more valued by ASEAN members than by 
the ASEAN+3 free trade area. The inverse relationship for FTA is possible since two countries that have a 
free trade agreement may be more likely to export so there is less need for FDI between them.   
 Results for model two are shown in Table 3.2.  The ASEAN+3 countries estimates are made with 
and without FDI using variable country, partner and year fixed effect estimation with robust 
heteroscedasticity errors applied. The first estimation serves as a benchmark so that the gross impact of 
the associations can be measured on trade.  This is a technique used in other research—notably Rose 
(2000)—as well as de Sousa & Lochard. The second estimation controls for the FDI channel.  There is a 
small difference in the number a data available for the second estimation.   The coefficient signs 
remained consistent between estimations.  
 
Table 3.2:  Estimation of Gravity Equation for Model Two  
                      (        )                         
                                 
 
 ASEAN+3 Countries 
 Benchmark With FDI 
Constant         -9.180***  
(-10.990) 
-5.436***  
(-3.897) 
   (        )      0.588***  
(12.649) 
0.330***  
(4.050) 
                 -0.126***  
(-2.777) 
-0.146***  
(-3.024) 
         1.980*  
(1.755) 
1.724  
(1.247) 
NEWS 0.010  
(0.059) 
-0.237  
(-1.271) 
ASEAN 0.283**  
(2.490) 
0.277**  
(2.370) 
FTA 0.708***  
(5.585) 
0.737***  
(5.314) 
           0.037  
(1.020) 
Adj-R2 0.84 0.84 
# Obs 2641 2371 
*significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, ***significant at 10% level, 
White robust standard errors are in parentheses 
Country and year dummies not reported 
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(Table 3.2 Continued) 
Variables definition: 
FDIi: Total Foreign Direct Investment in country i from the world divided by World CPI 
Voli,k: Volatility The difference in the log of the nominal bilateral exchange; the nominal exchange rate is 
in direct quotation or units of local currency j to buy one unit of foreign currency k 
FTA: A dummy indicating that both country and partner belong to a free trade agreement (besides 
ASEAN) 
 
trade: Bilateral trade between country i and k. 
Yi,t : GDP of country i at time t 
Yk,t : GDP of country i at time t 
 
 
 There is a difference in the estimation with the control for the FDI channel applied. ASEAN 
membership tested significant and positive at the 5% level.  The constant, distance, the size proxy, and 
the existence of the Free Trade Agreement all tested significant at the 10% level.  Size had a positive and 
significant impact on trade as did ASEAN membership and the existence of the FTA. Distance had 
significant and inverse relationship with trade which means that trade is inversely related to the proxy 
for transportation costs.   
 Belonging to ASEAN and being part of the ASEAN+3 Free Trade Zone has a positive influence on 
trade.  ASEAN membership is worth slightly less to trade in the second estimation than the first while 
the FTA has a more positive relationship in the second estimation than the first.   The surprising result 
was the positive coefficient for volatility that was significant in the benchmark model and not the 
second. However, the exchange rate volatility that impacts trade in lieu of FDI like the first model may 
not be a completely unreasonable result in a region with the presence of huge economies like Japan that 
import food and other basics from nearby countries and rely on exports to other developed nations to 
pay for the resources their country lacks.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Interest in the costs and benefits of exchange rate regimes has increased along with the increase in 
global trade and financing.  The notion that each country should select a one size-fits-all regime has 
generally been replaced with considering a correct regime for certain circumstances.  Developed and 
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developing regions have committed to monetary and financial integration to increase their share of 
world trade and FDI because of the experience of the EU.  However, the chance for successful 
unification in regions less developed is still an area under intense scrutiny.  There are many factors that 
can inhibit unification.  These include fiscal and monetary factors as well as geographical, political, and 
cultural factors.  More research is needed to estimate the benefits and costs of unification as well as 
the preparedness of regions for unification.   There is a definite need for determination as to why 
currency unions tend to raise the level of trade and FDI. There are potential explanations, but none 
have been thoroughly investigated. 
Models frequently focus on EU experience. It is reasonable to assume that models developed to 
analyze EU data should be applicable to other monetary unions and trade arrangements if the data is 
available.  Of special interesting is a potential monetary union that is in process.  It should be possible to 
measure and capture the positive benefits of association, movement towards integration, and the 
existence of free trade arrangements as the proposed currency union region progresses towards 
integration.  
The refined gravity models in this research evaluate data from ASEAN as it furthers its process of 
unification and study the relevant factors to unification and their impact on trade and FDI.  Since much 
of the research has been done on the EU, the aim is to capture more fully the sources of the costs and 
benefits to the unification process in lieu of post-unification status.  The model with direct estimation 
of Trade based on deSousa & Lochard (2004) showed different results than the model with direct 
estimation of FDI based on Bénnasy-Quéré et al (2000) suggesting the difference in underlying basic 
motivators and decision variables for each.  FDI—at the micro level—is basically a business and 
individual investment decided by expected returns, patterns of volatility, and opportunity for profit.  In 
the FDI model, exchange rate volatility was determined to have a significantly negative effect on FDI 
inflows around the region.   Volatility means uncertainty and increased risk which deters investment.  
FDI responds positively to countries experiencing currency devaluation in the region.  
While, businesses that engage in trade are motivated by these factors, trade—at a macro level—is 
motivated by the desire to either grow a domestic economy or provide additional goods and services 
not adequately produced by the domestic market.  The unification step of establishing Free Trade 
Agreements or announcements of agreement was found significant in the FDI model.   The Trade model 
found ASEAN membership and Free Trade agreements significant and positively related to trade. This 
indicates that progression to unification can carry benefits to member countries. 
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Appendix A 
Table A.13:  Key Dates and Steps in ASEAN History 
Date Action 
08/1967 ASEAN  established by the five original member countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore 
and Thailand 
02/1976 First ASEAN Summit convenes in Bali, Indonesia 
09/1978 First ASEAN-European Economic Community ministerial meeting held in Brussels 
01/1984 Brunei joins ASEAN 
01/1994 ASEAN establishes the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)focused on security interdependence 
07/1995 Vietnam joins ASEAN 
07/1997 Laos and Myanmar join ASEAN 
12/1997 First meeting of ASEAN Plus Three, comprising leaders of the 10 ASEAN members and their 
counterparts from East Asia -- China, Japan and South Korea 
12/1997 First ASEAN-China Summit convenes in Malaysia 
04/1999 Cambodia joins ASEAN  
05/2000 Chiang Mai Initiative announced to stabilize exchange rates using a currency swap arrangement  for 
ASEAN+3 
04/2003 RIA Fin Blueprint for integration of financial and monetary sectors announced 
11/2004 Framework Agreement for the Integration of Priority Sectors 
12/2005 First meeting of the ASEAN Plus Six—also called the East Asia Summit—comprising the ASEAN 
countries plus China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand 
11/2007 ASEAN signs charter giving its 10 member states a legal identity   
05/2007 Further Expansion of CMI  for ASEAN+3 announced 
11/2009 16 Bilateral agreements made on CMI for ASEAN+3 on state contributions to currency reserves pool, 
Hong Kong SAR joins 
12/2010 CMI signed 
03/2010 
 
Shocks: 
1997-98 
2007-08 
2008-10 
 
FTAS 
CMI initiates multilateral swamp arranges for ASEAN+3 
 
 
Asian Financial Crisis 
Global Financial Crisis 
Thai Political Crisis 
 
 
ASEAN–Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP): effective December 2008 
ASEAN – Australia – New Zealand Free Trade Area (AANZFTA):between ASEAN and ANZCERTA effective 
January 2010 
ASEAN–China Free Trade Area (ACFTA): effective January 2010 
ASEAN-India Trade in Goods (TIG) Agreement: effective January 2010 ,ASEAN-India Trade in Services 
and Investment Agreements still under negotiation 
ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Agreement: trade in goods provisions effective June 2007, trade in services 
signed 2007, trade in investments provisions signed  2009 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia and additional ASEAN+3  Joint Arrangements talks 
to commence in 2012 
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